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In the best traditions of scholarly debate Professor John Norton
Moore has taken sharp and fundamental issue with the legal analysis
of the United States' role in the Viet Nam War that I outlined in a
previous issue of the Yale Law Journal.' Professor Moore has not per-
suaded me either that my approach is "simplistic" or that its applica-
tion to Viet Nam is "unsound," but he has identified weaknesses and
incompletenesses in my earlier formulation.2 In addition, he has devel-
oped an alternative legal framework for assessing foreign intervention
in violent struggles for the control of a national society. My objective
in responding is to clarify the contending world order positions that
each of us espouses. Although Professor Moore affirms and I deny the
legality of the United States' military role in Viet Nam, the main center
of intellectual gravity in this debate is less passing judgment on the
grand legal issue of American presence (at this stage, a legalistic ex-
ercise), than it is assessing the policy implications of the Viet Nam
precedent for the future of international legal order.
Professor Moore and I agree that international law can serve as a
significant source of guidance to the national policy-maker in the area
of war and peace. International law implies a process of decision incor-
porating perspectives that tend to be left out of account when govern-
ment officials develop national policies solely by considering capabili-
ties, strategies, and current foreign policy goals that are designed to
maximize the short-run "national advantage." International lav con-
tains rules and standards rooted in the cosmopolitan tradition of a
community of nations, whereas foreign policy tends to be rooted in the
more particularistic traditions of each state. The future of world legal
order may depend to a great degree on the extent to which the decision
process relied upon in principal states to form foreign policy can come
increasingly to incorporate more cosmopolitan perspectives.
t Milbank Professor of International Law, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs; Faculty Associate, Center of International Studies, Princeton Univer-
sity; BS. 1952, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1955, Yale University.
1. Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War, 75 YALE
L.J. 1122 (1966).
2. Pages in parentheses in this article refer to Professor Moore's article.
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International law has itself evolved through a process of decision in
which national policies governing the appropriate uses of military
power have been clarified by the assertion of adverse national claims
buttressed by, supporting explanations and rationale. This process is
especially germane whenever the relevance of the rules to the claims of
states is challenged on a legal basis, as it has been since the outset of
major United States involvement in Viet Nam. The claims of govern-
ments to use or resist coercion serve as precedents for future claims and
imply commitments to develop a certain kind of international legal
system deemed beneficial both to the countries directly concerned and
to the wider community of all states. My disagreement with Professor
Moore centers upon the degree of discretion that international law
presently accords to states with respect to the use of force in an interna-
tional conflict resembling the one that has unfolded in Viet Nam in the
years since 1954 and extends to the sorts of considerations (and their
relative weight) that should have been taken into account in the deci-
sions that led to the American military involvement at the various
stages of its increasing magnitude. I would contend that the American
military involvement resulted from a series of geo-political miscalcu-
lations, as well as from a process of decision insensitive to world order
considerations.
The Viet Nam conflict demonstrates the harmful consequences for
the control of international violence that can arise from contradictory
national interpretations of what constitutes "aggression" and what con-
stitutes permissible acts of "defense." Given the decentralized character
of international society, it becomes more important than ever, in my
view, to inhibit unilateral recourse to violence arising from contradic-
tory and subjective national interpretations of a conflict situation. The
war in Viet Nam illustrates a situation in which it is "reasonable" for
each side to perceive its adversary as guilty of unprovoked aggression.0
The potential for military escalation that follows from each side doing
whatever it deems necessary to uphold its vital interests is an alarming
freedom to grant governments in the nuclear age. My approach to these
world order issues presupposes the central importance of establishing
binding quasi-objective limits upon state discretion in international
3. For a persuasive account by a psychologist as to why the North Vietnamese perceive
the United States' role in Viet Nam as aggression see White, Misperception of Aggression
in Vietnam, 21 J. INT'L Anr. 123 (1967); for a more fully documented presentation of the
same position by the same author see White, Misperception and the Vietnam War, 22
J. SOCIAL IssUEs 1 (1967). The prospect of mutually contradictory perceptions of aggression
held in good faith is central to my argument against Professor Moore's approach to world
order problems. He takes no account of the reality or hazard of such misperception.
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situations in which such contradictory inferences of "aggression" are
characteristic. I would argue, also, that the whole effort of international
law in the area of war and peace since the end of World War I has been
to deny sovereign states the kind of unilateral discretion to employ
force in foreign affairs that the United States has exercised in Viet
Nam.
4
Professor Moore appears content to endorse virtually unfettered
sovereign discretion. In the role of a disinterested observer, he purports
to pass judgment on the legal status of a contested claim to use force.
Professor Moore sets forth a certain conception of world order that he
posits as crucial for human welfare, and then proceeds to examine
whether the claim to use force in the particular situation of Viet Nam
is compatible with it. Every national decision-maker is expected to
engage in the same process of assessment. But no account is taken of
the serious problems of auto-interpretation that arise when recourse to
force is contemplated or carried out in inflamed international settings.
These problems arise because each side tends toward a self-righteous
vindication of its own contentions and an equally dogmatic inattention
to the merits of the adversary's position. Professor Moore's approach
Tecalls the natural law tradition in which the purported deference to
the normative restraints operative upon the behavior of a Christian
prince turned out in practice to be little more than a technique of post
hoc rationalization on the part of a government and its supporters.
Surely, his analysis fails to accord reciprocal empathy to the adversary's
reasonable perceptions as to who is responsible for what in Viet Nam.
In fact, Professor Moore's endorsement of America's military role is
neither widely nor wholeheartedly shared among states normally allied
with the United States.5
It seems plain enough that Communist-oriented observers would re-
gard the air strikes by the United States against North Viet Nam as un-
provoked "aggression." Suggestions have even been made by more
militant opponents of the United States' war actions that the passive
4. For a concise history of these efforts see Q. WIUcrr, TRE RoLE OF I,'TrEwAno.AL LAw
IN THE ELMINATION OF WAR (1961).
5. Anthony Lewis has ,summarized the situation in concise and moderate terms: "To
go into the reasons for West European attitudes toward Vietnam would require rehearsing
all the arguments about America's role there. Suffice it to say that only the British
Government has had much favorable to say about American policy in Vietnam. No
European country has a single soldier there. Much of the public on the Continent, rightly
or not, see the situation as that of a huge power over-reacting." Lewis, Why Humplarey
Got That Abuse in Europe, N.Y. Times, April 16, 1967, § 4, at 4, col. 4. Even the British
Government has disassociated itself through a formal statement by her Prime Minister
from United States bombing in June of 1966 of oil installations in Hanoi and Haiphong.
For text of Mr. Wilson's statement see BRrnsa Rcoma, No. 12, July 14, 1966, Supp.
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role of the Soviet Union amounts to "appeasement" of the United
States and that it is the Soviet Union, not the United States, that should
heed the lesson of Munich.0 Professor Moore's emphasis on the discre-
tion of the United States to furnish military assistance to Saigon needs
to be supplemented by a consideration of what military assistance it
would be reasonable for the Soviet Union and China to give to Hanoi;
would not North Viet Nam be entitled to act in collective self-defense
in response to sustained, large-scale bombing of its territory? And what
limits could be legally placed on its exercise of self-defense other than
those self-imposed by prudence and incapacity?
If we examine the war in Viet Nam from the perspective of North
Viet Nam and with the same deference to self-determined reasonable-
ness that Professor Moore confers upon the United States Government
then it seems clear that the failure of the war to reach global propor-
tions has been a consequence of Soviet and Chinese restraint (or in-
capacity); that is, Moore's world order position seems to legalize almost
unlimited escalation by adversaries that perceive an ally as a victim of
"aggression," even though that perception is not vindicated by any
wider community determination and even though disinterested and
reasonable men disagree as to who did what to whom. My earlier classi-
fication of international conflict into three broad categories is based on
the need to avoid the anarchic consequences of adversary perception
by fixing arbitrary but definite legal limits upon divergent interpreta-
tions of the rights and duties of national governments that find them-
selves involved in Viet Nam-type situations.7
Perhaps my position can be clarified by showing in a preliminary
way why I reject the analogy between Viet Nam and Korea, an analogy
that Professor Moore invokes to argue that similar defensive measures
are appropriate in the two settings. 8 If the facts in Viet Nam are as
6. See, e.g., a passage from an editorial appearing in the French intellectual journal
Les Temps Moderne: "The lack of clarity, the prudent policy of 'wait and see' are the
tombs of the Socialist and revolutionary movement; they pave the way for other disasters
just as surely as nonintervention against Spanish Fascism in 1936 set the stage for 19-10
and what followed. But the parallel extends beyond the Spanish Civil War; it includes
the capitulations that preceded and followed the Munich Agreements.
"The United States is convinced that the Soviet Union will desist from any test of
strength until the end." The editorial goes on to call for "Socialist counter-escalation"
by means of Soviet rocket strikes at United States air and naval installations in the Pacific
area. Affirmative: A Deliberate Risk, translated and reprinted in 12 ATLAs, Nov. 1966,
at 19, 20.
7. The basic rationale is set forth in Falk, supra note I, at 1122-28. E.g., the United
States is reported to have criticized the United Arab Republic for its attacks on Saudi
Arabian border towns in the course of the struggle waged between the rival Yemeni
factions for control of the Yemen. See N.Y. Times, May 17, 1967, at 1, col. 7.
8. There are other significant differences, including a war ending In 1954 for control
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Professor Moore and the United States Government contend, then it
might be true that North Viet Nam is guilty of a covert equivalent of
the aggression that was attempted overtly in 1950 by North Korea.0 But
the assessment of the facts in Viet Nam is subject to multiple interpre-
tations by reasonable observers in a way that the facts in Korea were
not. Only the Communist states argued seriously against the conclusion
that North Korea was an aggressor. Her overt military attack was suffi-
ciently clear to permit a global consensus to form in support of defen-
sive action by South Korea. In contrast, the obscurity of the conflict in
Viet Nam generates widespread disagreement outside the Communist
world as to whether either side can be termed "the aggressor," and im-
partial observers as august as the Secretary General of the United Na-
tions1° and the Pope 1 have repudiated any interpretation of the war
of the entire country, election provisions to translate this military outcome into political
control at a time certain (1956), and a central government in Saigon that did not offer
much prospect of governing South Viet Nam in any stable fashion even apart from Com-
munist harrassment. Part of the relevant background is the demonstrated competence of
Ho Chi Minh to govern Viet Nam in an effective manner, a competence evident e'en in
the writings of those who are hostile to Communism and opposed to reunification under
Hanoi's control. The capacity to govern territorial units effectively in the areas of the
world most vulnerable to domestic trauma is itself a valuable constituent of the sort of
international stability that the United States aspires to achieve for the Afro-Asian v'orld.
The background of Vietnamese social and cultural history also supports strongly the
inference of an autonomous Vietnamese spirit, one that above all would resist any effort
at domination by the Chinese. Ho Chi Minh's reasonableness was demonstrated in the
period after World War II when he co-operated successfully with non-Communist factions
in Viet Nam and made notable concessions to the French in exchange for an acknowledg-
ment of his leadership of an independent Republic of Viet Nam; the French later re-
pudiated these negotiations and the first Indochina War was born. For the sense of back-
ground see E. HAA.MR, THE STRUGGLc FOR INDO-CHINA 1940-1955 (1955); L. BoIoM, Taz
QuicsAND WAR (1967); J. BuTrrGER, VwrmAm: Ta EmmTA-rrx D AcoN [hereinafter cited
as BurmcER].
Recently these points have also been made effectively in Farer, The Enemy-Fxploring
the Sources of a Foreign Policy, COLU-MBIA U'Tv.R.sn FORUN, Spring 1957, at 13; see espe-
dally his quotation of the remark of Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for
Far Eastern Affairs (an anti-Communist of such extreme character as to antagonize Anthony
Eden because of his "emotional" approach): "If only Ho Chi Minh were on our side we
could do something about the situation. But unfortunately he is the enemy." Id. 13.
9. It is important, however, to appreciate the degree of ambiguity that necessarily
inheres in the context of covert coercion unless the foreign state proclaims its aggressive
design, as has the United Arab Republic in relation to Israel. Without such a proclama-
tion, one never made by North Viet Nam, the attribution of motives is speculative and
unconvincing, especially if the assumed motives are relied upon to justify major respon-
sive violence. In Korea, it was North Korea that justified its recourse to overt coerdon
by vague and unsupportable allegations that South Korea was planning to attack North
Korea.
Bernard Fall commenting on the assertion "that North Vietnamese infiltration into
South Viet Nam is the equivalent of the North Korean invasion of the ROK" writes that
the comparison "omits the embarrassing fact that anti-Diem guerrillas were active long
before infiltrated North Vietnamese elements joined the fray." B. FALL, Tir Two VLur-
Nsais 345 (2d rev. ed. 1967).
10. There are many indications of Thantes position on the matter. E.g., N.Y. Times,
June 21, 1966, at 1, col. 5.
11. Cf. Pope Paul's Encyclical on Peace of Sept. 19, 1966, text in N.Y. Times, Sept. 20,
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in Viet Nam that identifies North Viet Nam as the aggressor. France
has openly repudiated the United States' conception of the war, and
neutral public opinion at home and abroad is, to say the least, sharply
split.12 This situation of dissensus sharply distinguishes Viet Nam from
1966, at 18, col. 2. For example, taking account of the tradition of indirect rhetoric, the
following passage was written with obvious application to war in Viet Nam: "We cry to
them in God's name to stop. Men must come together and offer concrete plans and terms in
all sincerity. A settlement should be reached now, even at the expense of some inconvc
nience or loss, for it may have to be made later in the train of bitter slaughter and involve
great loss." The following sentence also confirms the emphasis upon the non-condemnation
of either side as aggressor: "Now again, therefore, we lift up our voice, 'with piercing
cry and with tears' (Hebrews, v, 7), very earnestly beseeching those who have charge of
the public welfare to strive with every means available to prevent the further spread of
the conflagration, and even to extinguish it entirely." More recently, Pope Paul VI has
specifically urged the cessation of all forms of violence throughout Viet Nam. N.Y. Times,
May 25, 1967, at 4, col. 4.
12. I regard the unprecedented intensity, range, and character of the protest move-
ment directed at the American military involvement in Viet Nam to be significantly
relevant to an appraisal of the status of United States claims under international law.
The standards governing the use of force in world affairs reflect moral attitudes toward
those occasions upon which it is appropriate to rely upon military power. This wide-
spread protest phenomenon reflects the moral conviction of people throughout the world
that the United States is guilty of aggressive war in Viet Nam; such a moral conviction
is not inconsistent with the democratically-based support for the war given by the Ameri-
can public, according priority to winning a war that should not have been fought rather
than to accepting the need to acknowledge error. Edwin 0. Reischauer, the former
American Ambassador to Japan, has well stated this orientation toward the war taken
by those who continue to give their support, however, grudgingly, to the American effort
in Viet Nam:
There is not much agreement in this country about the war in Vietnam, except that
it is something we should have avoided. We are paying a heavy price for it-in lives,
in national wealth and unity, and in international prestige and influence. The best
we can hope for from the war is sufficient peace and stability to allow that small
and weak country to get painfully to its feet at last; the worst is a nuclear conflict
too horrible to contemplate. Reischauer, What We Should do Next in Asia, LooK,
April 4, 1967, at 21.
It may also be well to ponder the following paragraph from the editorial columns of
The New Reublic:
Simultaneously [with other beneficial international policies of the United States]
Mr. Johnson is pushing the Vietnam war-which is a disastrous thing. It is all very
well to say the country backs him, Governor Romney being the latest "me too'
recruit. Yes, the polls show the public supports continued bombing, 67 percent. But
a second series of polls shows only 37 percent backing Mr. Johnson's handling of
the war. Reconciling these two views isn't really very difficult. The public loathes
the war. It doesn't want defeat, but it wants out. The two moods conflict. It backs
the bombing on the simplistic ground that that will end the war quickly. And it is
taking out its resentment for the war dilemma consciously or unconsciously by making
Mr. Johnson the scapegoat. THE NEw REPUBLIC, April 22, 1967, at 2.
Among those aspects of the protest against participation in the war that are most legally
notable have been the efforts, never made in the Korean context to nearly the same ex.
tent, to obtain a determination by domestic courts that participation in the Viet Nam war
is tantamount to the commission of a war crime; the reasoning being that the German
and Japanese war crimes trials conducted after World War II concluded that an individ.
ual is criminally accountable for participation in a war of aggression (i.e., an illegal war)
regardless of whether or not he is carrying out the orders of his government. There are
also many cases now arising for the first time of "selective conscientious objection" in
which individuals subject to the draft are claiming exemption not because they are
opposed to war in general but because they oppose the Viet Nam war in particular on
grounds of conscience. A dramatic instance of litigation to test whether there is a legal
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Korea and strongly suggests that the discretion to act "defensively" re-
quires some source of restraint more dependable than the wisdom of
the belligerent states. 13
The presence or absence of a consensus has considerable bearing on
the legal status of a contested claim to use force in international so-
ciety.14 The Charter of the United Nations purports to restrict the
unilateral discretion of states to use force to resolve international con-
flicts.' 5 In cases where a claim of self-defense is made and challenged,
right of conscientious objection to a particular war has been filed. Capt. Dale E. Noyd
of the Air Force Academy in the Federal District Court of Colorado in Denver. N.Y. Times,
April 20, 1967, at 5, col. 3; for a description of the litigation see Cnvt. LInIMrs, No. 245,
April 1967, at 1, 5. For a continuing description of evidence supporting the invocation
of selective conscientious objection in the Viet Nam context see the responsible reporting
of the weekly British newspaper Peace News, the bi-monthly American magazine VZr
REPORT, or almost any French organ of opinion (left, right, or center). For one (among
many) vivid account of the horrors inflicted on Vietnamese society see McCarthy, Report
from Vietnam II: The Problems of Success, N.Y. RPvmv or Boos, May 4, 1967, at 4.
Furthermore, for the first time during a period of war a group of international lawyers
have gone on record against their own government to contend that the United States
military involvement in Viet Nam is "illegal," and constitutes a violation of both
international law and the US. Constitution. CoNsULTATIVE CouNciL or Timn LmWis'
C6Nmrnna ON ASIERIcA Pouicy TowARws VIETNAM AND INTERNATtONAL LAW (1967)
[hereinafter cited as CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL]. The members of the Consultative Council
are R. J. Barnet, R. A. Falk (Chairman), John H.E. Fried (Rapporteur), John H. HerM
Stanley Hoffmann, Wallace McClure, Saul H. Mendlovitz, Richard S. Miller, Hans J.
Morgenthau, William G. Rice, and Quincy Wright.
Also for the first time since World War II there has been proposed a war crime tribunal
to pass judgment on the United States role in Viet Nam and on the criminal responsibility
of its President. Of course, Bertrand Russel's tribunal is a juridical farce, but the fact
that it is plausible to contemplate such a proceeding and to obtain for its tribunal several
celebrated individuals bears witness to the general perception of the war. For Jean.Paul
Sartre's explanation of why he has agreed to serve as a judge on the Russell tribunal see
Sartre, Imperialist Morality, 41 NEv Lr Rrvnv 3 (1967).
See also SENATE REPUBUCAN Poucy Co,.%rtrrrEE, BLUE Boor, ON VLEr N&,Mt (May 1,
1967); for the text of its principal conclusions questioning the entire basis of the war
see excerpts from G.O.P. Paper on War, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1967, at 10, col. 3.
13. The vagueness of the justification is accentuated in consequence by the gradual
evolution of "the commitment." What started off in Viet Nam as a reluctant and indirect
involvement that needed no special justification was successively widened and deepened
until the involvement itself became the principal justification. With over 400,000 Americans
fighting in Viet Nam and with casualties continuing to mount, there is a sense that the
American effort must not be in vain; the consequence is an apparently irreversible govern-
ment commitment to use military means to accomplish a political objective-namely, to
defeat the Vietcong insurrection, without according any governmental legitimacy to the
N.L.F.
14. The relevance of an international consensus to the legality of contested national
action is considered in Falk, On the Quasi-Legislativc Competence of the General Assembly,
60 Am. J. rr'TL L. 782 (1966). And see the dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka in the South
West Africa Cases for an analysis in the setting of human rights of the sift from an
emphasis upon sovereign autonomy to community solidarity in determining the character
of international legal obligations. judgment in the South West Africa Cases, July 18, 1966,
[1966] LC.J. 248, 292-94.
15. For a helpful exposition of the restrictive intention of the relevant Charter pro-
visions see Henkin, Force, Intervention, and Neutrality in Contemporary International
Law, 1963 Pnoc. AM. Soc'v INr'TL L. 147; P. Jnssu, A MoDE.MN Lw or NAro.s 165-67
(1948); in this context it is not necessary to contend that Article 51 restricts traditional
self-defense in terms of some rigid conception of "armed attack," but only that the dis-
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the burden of justification is upon the claimant. It is always possible
to argue that a use of force is "defensive" and that it promotes world
order by inhibiting "aggression." Therefore, fairly clear community
standards would be needed to assure that what is called "defensive" is
defensive; in the absence of clear community standards it becomes im-
portant to allow international institutions to determine whether re-
course to "defensive force" is justified by a prior "armed attack." Where
there are no generally accepted objective standards and where rivals
put forward contradictory factual interpretations it becomes difficult
or impossible to mobilize a consensus in the international institutions
entrusted with the maintenance of peace and security.10 Viet Nam pre-
sents such a situation of uncertainty and institutional paralysis. What
restraints upon sovereign discretion to use force remain relevant? The
appraisals of disinterested international civil servants, especially the
cretion of states to have recourse to force in self-defense is subject to justification and
review. See, e.g., D. BowErr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 216-18, 241, 244-45, 261
(1958), emphasizing the importance of restricting discretionary recourse to self-defense,
especially on a collective basis, in the Viet Nam-type situation.
16. Even a defensive alliance such as SEATO has been unable to maintain its solidarity
in the face of the disputed facts and policies generated by the Viet Nam conflict. France
and Pakistan, both Members, refuse to give their assent to SEATO's endorsement of the
American "interpretation" of the war in Viet Nam. It should be recalled that SEATO
was a pact among anti-Communist states determined to resist the coercive spread of
Asian Communism, including explicitly its spread to South Viet Nam; the non-Communist
neutralist states of Asia are, without exception, even more dubious about the American
"interpretation." The relevant point is that a claim to be acting in a "defensive" way
when force is used against a foreign society has no legal status unless it is supported by
some kind of international authorization that commands respect; otherwise it is merely
a contention by an adversary determined to make unilateral use of military power against
a foreign society.
A study of South Viet Nam attitudes suggest that even in the late phases of the war
in Viet Nam the people of the country reject the official United States version of "defet.
sive" action. The poll was conducted for Columbia Broadcasting Company by Opinion
Research Corporation, a respected professional polling outfit, consisted of an interview
of 1,545 persons living in five major cities, 55 hamlets, and was limited to civilians of
voting age living in "secured areas," those not under Vietcong control; The poll took
place between November 24, 1966 and February 1, 1967. When asked who was responsible
for continuing the war 31 per cent blamed the Vietcong and only 12 per cent blamed the
Government of North Viet Nam; when asked whether bombing should be continued
against villages suspected of containing the Vietcong 46 per cent favored an end to bomb-
ing while 37 per cent wanted it continued; when asked whether to stress negotiations
with North Viet Nam or to extend military operations to North Viet Nam 60 per cent
favored more emphasis on negotiations whereas only about 14 per cent favored increased
military action; and finally when asked whether they favored reunification after the end
of the war 83 per cent were reported in favor and only 5 per cent opposed. N.Y.Times,
March 22, 1967, at 10, col. 7. The remarkable thing about this poll is that among strong
anti-Communist South Vietnamese (65 per cent blamed the Communist side for the con-
tinuation of the war and only 5 per cent blamed the anti-Communist side) exposed pri.
marily to government propaganda there still appears to be a rejection of the Amerfcan
idea that the war is a consequence of "aggression from the North." The attitudes on
reunification also sharply question the Saigon-Washington insistence on separate sover-
eighty for the North and the South. See the similar character of an anti-Communist, anti-
American interpretation of the war by a distinguished Buddhist in South Viet Nam,
T. HANH, VIEMNAM Lorus IN A SEA OF FIRE (1967).
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Secretary General of the United Nations, are distinctly relevant in this
setting. The Secretary General contributes an impartial perspective and
can, as U Thant has chosen to do with respect to Viet Nam, delineate
the character of reasonable behavior by the adversary parties.17 Nor-
mally such an official will refrain from judging the behavior of the
participants in a conflict that cannot be handled by agreement in the
-political organs. The persistent refusal of the United States to comply
with U Thant's proposals is indicative of its unilateral approach to the
determination of the legitimacy of a contested use of international
force.18 The essence of a law-oriented approach to the use of force is to
17. The essential aspect of a legal settlement is the search for impartial sources of
decision. It is the impartial decision-maker that is in the best position to assess the rela-
tive merits of adversary positions. This does not assure correct or just decisions in any
particular instance, but merely that there will be a legal quality for the decision. The
Secretary General of the United Nations is the most authoritative impartial decision-maker
in the international system, especially in relation to Members of the United Nations. To
deny his role or to ignore his recommendation is to subordinate the process of impartial
decision to the process of unilateral decision, tending thereby to rely on power rather
than law to shape the outcome of controversy.
18. The opposition of the United States to the efforts of U Thant to work for a
settlement are summarized in Amsmuc., Famns SEsvscE Cots.rrrEE, PrAcz INi Vi'sNwAM
50-52 (1966); F. ScHnmmAz'NN, P. ScoTr, & R. ZELNUr, Tm Potrrics oF Esa.ubo x Vzjnr.%,,
135-38 (1966). On June 20, 1966, U Thant made a three-point proposal for ending the
war in Viet Nam:
(.) Unconditional cessation of bombing in North Viet Nam;
(2.) Scaling down of military operations in South Viet Nam;
(3.) Inclusion of the National Liberation Front in any proposed negotiations.
N.Y. Times, June 21, 1966, at 1, col. 5. The failure of the United States to accept this
proposal, consisting according to U Thant of those steps that "alone can create the condi-
tions" leading to a peaceful settlement, is indicative of its unilateral approach to the use
of military power in Viet Nam. U Thant, as Secretary General, represents the voice of
the international community, a voice that deserves to be heeded especially by a Great
Power using its military power to overvhelm a small state. The role of the Secretary
General in identifying reasonable conduct for parties in conflict is especially great when
the political organs have failed to discharge their responsibility to maintain international
peace and security. As in other dealings with the United Nations during the Viet Nam
war the United States has made pro forma gestures indicating its acceptance of the Secre-
tary General's role. See, e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg's letter to U Thant in which it is said
that "the United States Government will cooperate fully with you in getting such dis-
cussion started promptly [on ending the war] and in bringing them to a successful com-
pletion." Text, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1966, at 6, col. 4. The United States will cooperate
fully provided that it does not have to alter its belligerent and political posture. U Thant
is setting forth his conception of reasonable preconditions for peace talks. What does our
cooperation entail if it does not lead to an acceptance of these preconditions? Our non-
cooperation 'with U Thant is heightened by the fact that the preconditions he describes
are those that seem calculated to bring the war to an end and to initiate negotiations on
a reasonable basis that corresponds to the domestic balance of forces. Negotiations would
proceed on an unnatural basis if either the suspension of bombing v-as conditional-it
would be a dub of death suspended by a powerful state over the destinies of a weak
one-or the N.L.F. was not accorded some degree of legitimacy as a political force in South
Viet Nam of a character equal to that of the Saigon regime. The insistence on non-
recognition is part of the effort to negotiate as if the N.L.F. were a creature of North Viet
Nam rather than a political entity with a reality of its own. President Johnson has often
repeated the idea that during the negotiations "the Vietcong will have no difficulty having
their views heard," but this is not a very satisfactory assurance for an insurgent faction
that has fought for over a decade to control South Viet Nam. Transcript of President's
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submit claims to the best available procedures for community review
and to restrict force to the levels authorized.19
A second kind of restraint in a situation of ambiguity is to confine
violence within existing international boundaries. The decision by the
United States to bomb North Viet Nam and to take military action in
the territory of Laos and Cambodia is further disregard for available
limits upon the self-interpretation of legal rights.20 It is true that the
United States is not yet using all the military power at its disposal
against North Viet Nam, but such restraint is itself based on the exer-
cise of discretion rather than upon deference to community procedures
or to quasi-objective standards of limitation.
2
1
News Conference on the Guam Parley, N.Y. Times, March 22, 1967, at 11, col. 3. It does
not make the consent of the N.L.F. an ingredient of settlement, nor does it give to the
N.L.F. any of the formal prerogatives of the Saigon regime. In effect, the civil war is
ended not as a stalemate, but as a victory for the government side as it remains the sole
constituted political 6lite.
19. We associate the intervention of law in human affairs with the role of the third.
party decision-maker who is entrusted with the task of sorting out adversary contentions.
International society as decentralized often successfully works out the content of reason-
ableness through action and interaction of adversary parties, provided the issues at stake
are not vital to national security or national honor. In the context of force, however, the
differential of power between adversaries of unequal strength influences their degree of
flexibility in responding to counter-claims; the differences between the results of adversary
interaction and of impartial third-party judgment are likely to be pronounced. The sub.
sitution of law for force in any social order involves, then, the gradual replacement of the
ideology of self-help by that of third-party judgment. Perhaps, the clearest jurisprudential
discussion of the limits of law in a decentralized political system is contained in H. KrtsN,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 3-87 (2d rev. ed. Tucker 1966).
20. Both sides have violated "the sovereignty" of Laos and Cambodia, but the United
States has frequently bombed infiltrators and supply lines within the territory of both
states, thereby expanding further the extra-national scope of violence beyond South Viet
Nam. See MANSFIELD, ET AL., REPORT TO SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS Cobnra., 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., THE VIETNAM CONFLICr: TnE SUBSTANCE AND THE SHADOW 8-10 (Comm. Print 1966)
[hereinafter cited as THE MANSFIELD REPORT]. An equivalent action by North Viet Nam
or the Soviet Union would be to attack the United States air bases in Thailand. Such an
expansion of the arena of combat would move the conflict dramatically closer to the
threshold of general warfare. It is important to emphasize that the limited scope of the
war in Viet Nam is a consequence of the failure of the Soviet Union and China to take
equivalent action on behalf of Hanoi; such a failure is especially important in view of
the United States demand that Hanoi take equivalent action in exchange for an end to
bombing. See note 27 infra.
21. The United States reserves the discretion to decide for itself the degree of military
force that it requires to secure North Viet Nam's acquiescence. In this David and Goliath
situation, David is on a rack of death that has been slowly tightened over the years by a
process we describe as "escalation." Goliath has had and continues to have the capacity
at any point to kill David, but has sought instead to inflict pain and to threaten increas-
ing pain until David gives in to the demands of Goliath. There is no reciprocity in such
a situation of inequality. To claim restraint for Goliath is to ignore the rationale for
this way of proceeding by stages. Among other factors to bear in mind is that Goliath
knows that David has powerful, Goliath-like friends that may enter the scene more
acively. See, e.g., the report of Harry Ashmore's visit to Hanoi on behalf of the Center
for the Study of Democratic institutions in which he quotes "a Colonel of tie North
Vietnamese General Staff" who "answered very solemnly" a question about his estimate
"of North Vietnam's capacity to resist the American troops":
We've thought about this a great deal. We think we can handle up to 2,000,000
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In this respect, the mode of Type I conflict (Korea) allows propor-
tionate defense responses including unilateral action against the attack-
ing state,22 whereas in a Type II or III conflict (Viet Nam), third-party
military action is either prohibited altogether or its scope confined to
the political entity wherein the struggle is going on. In either event,
the tendency to escalate is curtailed. My categorization of international
conflict is intended to guide decision-makers and observers toward a
sense of what is reasonable in a particular situation. A strong element
of national discretion remains. The limits on international violence are
only quasi-objective restrictions upon sovereign prerogatives.2 There
Americans. This assumes that you do not increase your bombing beyond its present
level. I think your combat troops will concede that we are masters of guerrilla war.
We should be-we've been at it for twenty-five years. We are far less dependent on
heavy supplies than your army. We are accustomed to fighting in this terrain of
jungle and mountains and this advantage offsets the undoubted superiority of your
sophisticated weapons and planes. This is why we think we can handle up to 2,000,000
of your troops, and stay here the rest of the century if necessary. Of course, if you
put in more than 2,000,000 soldiers, or if you escalate the bombing to the point
where you completely destroy our communications, then we have to accept volunteers
from China, from Russia, and it would be a new war. It would no longer be our
war. It would be World War III.
Air. Ashmore commented that:
I have to assume an element of propaganda in this, but I also say that I believe the
Colonel meant what he said, and was consciously reflecting the considered judgment
of the North Vietnamese government. Ashmore, Pacem in Terris 11: Mission to North
Vietnam, CENran DiARY, March-April 1967, at 17.
22. Korea is not truly an example of Type I, but of Type IV, because the United States'
role was authorized by the United Nations; see pp. 1106-07 infra for explanation of Type
IV. Nevertheless, to point up the relationship between Korea and Viet Nam it is possible
to pierce the cosmopolitan veil, emphasize Soviet opposition and question the propriety
of an authorization obtained in the Security Council during the Soviet boycott, and thereby
view the response in Korea as if it proceeded without benefit of United Nations approval.
In that case, Korea would appear to be an instance of Type I authorizing whatever military
action is needed to restore the status quo ante the armed attack. On this basis I believe
that the defensive armies should not have proceeded beyond the 38th Parallel, although
it would have been permissible to commit war acts against North Korean territory so as
to restore the status quo ante.
• 23. The Legal Adviser, Leonard Meeker, finds no difficulty in reconciling my categories
of analysis with United States policy in Viet Nam: "The evidence does not allow for the
conclusion that the war in Viet-Nan 'was ever a simple category-one situation. It was
probably, for quite some period of time, a category-two situation. By the end of 1964,
however, it had become very dearly a category-three situation." Meker, l'iet-Nam and
the International Law of Self-Defense, 56 DEP'r STATE Buo.. 54, 59 (19677. Mr. Meeker
merely characterizes the facts to support the American legal position, including the shift
of the war into "the third category." (Type 1) By the end of 196, mainly over a period
of four years, about 40,000 are reported to have infiltrated from North Viet Nam accord-
ing to official United States statistics. Most of those infiltrated during this period were
ethnic Southerners that joined up with Vietcong units. There are several factors that
militate against Mr. Meeker's inference of "armed attack" (that is, category three): fist,
the insurgency pre-existed North Viemamese infiltration; as Fall notes "there had been
a fairly strong anti-Diem insurgent current of non-Communist origins even before the
1956 deadline on elections between the two zones went by... ." B. FALu. TME Two Vmr-
Nams 356 (2d rev. ed. 1967) (cf. map showing pattern of insurgent control as of 1962-63,
p. 354); second, the Saigon regime was enabled to resist the N.L.F. in the )cars before
1961 only because it was given such large amounts of economic support by the United
States in the years after 1954; as the first Mansfield Report observes "in matters of
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is also some uncertainty as to whether a particular conflict belongs in
one category rather than another. So long as the organized interna-
tional community is unable to determine the limits on authorized vio-
lence, thereby placing the conflict within Type IV (see next paragraph)
it remains necessary to rely upon national discretion. The objective of
articulating Types I-III is to enable a more rational exercise of national
discretion through the clarification of the relationship between factual
patterns and legal expectations. If states would adhere in practice to
these limits, ex parte interpretations of fact and of law on claims to use
violence in international society would decline in importance.
Professor Moore's world order position, as presently stated, ignores
the relevance of international institutions and of a supranational per-
spective to an assessment of the legal status of a controverted use of
military power. To emphasize the problem of curtailing national dis-
cretion in a world of political conflict I would now add Type IV to the
previous three types.24 Type IV conflict exists whenever a competent
international organization of global (IVa) or regional (IVb) dimensions
defense, internal stability and economic support, the Vietnamese Government has come
to depend almost wholly on the United States for outside assistance. In terms of aid, the
assumption of this preponderant responsibility has meant U.S. outlays of $1.4 billion for
economic assistance during the period of 1955-62. This economic aid has had some effect
on Vietnamese development, but its primary purpose has been to sustain the Vietnamese
economy so that it, in turn, could maintain the burden of a military establishment which
has been upward of 150,000 men for the past half decade. On top of the economic aid,
there has also been provided large amounts of military equipment and supplies and train-
ing for the Vietnamese Army, Navy, and Air Force and for other defense purposes. For
the period 1955-62 the total of aid of all kinds in Viet Nam stands at more than $2
billion. THE MANsFIELD REPORT, app. II, at 19. For tables on the degree of United States
involvement since 1954, see G. KAHIN & J. LEwis, Tim UNITED SrATS IN VIMNAi 78, 185
(1967) [hereinafter cited as KAHIN & LEwis].
The point is that North Vietnamese military assistance to an ongoing insurgency was
a proportionate response at all stages to the extent of United States involvement on behalf
of Saigon. And when one considers that North Viet Nam had a reasonable (if not absolutely
assured) expectation that the Geneva settlement would lead to unification under their con.
trol after a period of transition enabling the French to depart, then the American interposi.
tion of a powerful non-Vietnamese "presence" must also enter into an appraisal of North
Viet Nam's pre-1965 role. In such a context it seems unreasonable and without legal
foundation to construe North Viet Nam's military assistance to the Vietcong as becoming
an attack by one country on another. Without such a premise of attack, the United States
response against North Vietnamese territory would be "unprovoked aggression." Recourse
to self-defense implies a prior armed attack, and that is why United States position depends
on "the armed attack" taking place before bombing the North began in February 196S,
24. In my earlier article, then, Korea and Suez are not properly examples of Type I
after there was authorization of defensive action by the United Nations. Type I becomes
Type IV as soon as the United Nations itself acts or authorizes action. The description,
then, of Type I, in Falk, supra note 1, at 1126, should be amended accordingly. Types II
and III can also be transferred into Type IV, although the conjectural nature of the
facts and the less direct connection to international peace and security makes such a
transfer less likely to take place. The Indian attack upon Goa and the Chinese attack upon
Tibet are examples of Type I provided the victim entities are entitled to the status of
"states." Goa's defensive prerogatives are also qualified by the limited legitimacy of
colonial title to territory as of 1961.
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authorizes the use of force.2 5 Type IVa can be illustrated by reference
to United Nations actions in Korea (1950), Suez (1956), Cyprus, and
the Congo (1960). The authorization or prohibition of violence by the
United Nations resolves the issue of legality, even though a particular
decision may be arbitrary or unjust in any given set of circumstances.2
The point here is that Type IV entails an authoritative consensus that
may be absent in Types I-III.27 Thus, the context of my first Yale article
25. The legal status of Type IVb is more problematical than that of Type Iva. For
one thing regional organizations are themselves subject to regulation by the Security
Council (Article 53(l) says that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.').
For another, the opposition of the Arab League to Israel, of the Organization of African
Unity to South Africa, and of the Organization of American States to Castro's Cuba points
to the danger of "aggression" under the legitimizing aegis of supranationalism. At the
same time, the existence of regional support for recourse to coercion is a factor that
alters the legal status of a controversial use of military power. It is important to dis-
tinguish a regional actor-such as the O.A.S-from an ex parte defensive alliance-such
as SEATO. Authorization by SEATO would not move the conflict into Type IVb, although
the absence of such authorization might cast light on claims to respond within the frame-
work of Type I.
26. This possibility leads Julius Stone, among others, to deny almot altogether the
restrictive impact of the Charter system of controls upon the discretion of sovereign states.
J. STONE, AcRESSION AND WORM ORDER 1-3, 78-103 (1958).
27. In the absence of an authoritative consensus on a global level that embodies
divergent perspectives, the construction of second.order constraints upon adversary per-
spectives is the essential task of international law. Types l-Ill provide quasi-objective
guidelines that tend to confine an international conflict. Departures from these guidelines
could be justified legally by exceptional circumstances and for specific objectives. But the
second-order system of constraint depends on a fair correlation of the conflict with the
system of graduated categories. The United States insistence on viewing North Viet Nam's
role as warranting a Type I response is destructive of second-order constraints as the
basic categorization does not command respect from many uncommitted observers.
The generalized bombing of North Viet Nam could not be easily justified as an exception
to Type II. Specific attacks upon extra-territorial guerrilla sanctuaries might be justified
if the conflict was otherwise contained within Type II limits. But the objectives of bombing
North Viet Nam seem primarily connected with an overall effort to secure their acqui-
escence to our conception of the war in South Viet Nam. President Johnson's letter of
March 1, 1967 to Senator Jackson gives the Government's rationale for bombing North
Viet Nam in fairly complete terms; significantiy, this letter ends by saying "vre shall
persist with our operations in the North-until those who launched this aggression are
prepared to move seriously to reinstall the agreements whose violations have brought the
scourge of war to Southeast Asia." Earlier the letter says that bombing will end when
the other side is willing to take equivalent action - . " (emphasis added). See President
Reviews U.S. Position on Bombing of North Viet-Nam, 56 DEPr STATE Bu. 514, 516
(1967). What is equivalent action if it is conceded that extra-territorial violence is, at
best, an extraordinary incident of a Type II conflict? Supplying and sending troops to
aid the N.L.. is a normal incident of Type 1 conflict. To demand, as seem implied by
the official United States position, the elimination of a normal claim by a third-party state
in exchange for the termination of an extraordinary claim (and in Viet Nam the extra-
ordinary nature of the claim is aggravated by its assertion in extravagant, unspecific, and
accelerating form) by its third-party opponent seems highly unreasonable. It is worth
recalling that the United States' original justification for bombing North Viet Nam in
February 1965 was formulated in the restrictive and exception.explaining logic of Type
II as a reprisal for Vietcong attacks on United States airfields in South Viet Nam; it is
worth noting that the legal reflex in February 1965 was in the manner of Type U1, not
Type L This is worth noting because of the subsequent official explanations that the
Viet Nam war dearly belonged to Type I by the end of 1964. Cf. note 23 supra; see also
The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam, Office of the
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and of this reply to Moore is provided by the conflict in Viet Nam, a
conflict in which the United Nations has not been able to act collec-
tively through its main political organs. 28 This context is in the range
of Types I-III.
29
Having set forth the factors that shape my world order position, I
will turn now to Professor Moore's specific criticisms of my approach.
He has three main objectives:
(1) I have construed the Viet Nam facts in a one-sided manner;
(2) My system of categorization imposes arbitrary limits on a state
using force for defensive purposes;
(3) My system really declares my views as to what international law
ought to be although it pretends to be a statement of present legal obli-
gations binding upon a state.
Professor Moore's first principal criticism pertains primarily to my
argument that it would have been appropriate to regard the conflict in
Viet Nam as an example of a Type III conflict, that is, as an example
of civil strife internal to one country. The second and third criticisms
pertain primarily to my chief argument that the conflict in Viet Nam,
whatever its early history, has become an example of Type II conflict,
that is, an example of civil strife in South Viet Nam with substantial
intervention on behalf of the two contending factions, the Saigon
regime and the National Liberation Front (N.L.F.) (these criticisms
are discussed below in Section II).
Legal Adviser, Department of State, 112 CONG. REc. 5274 (daily ed. March 10, 1966). For
original reliance on a reprisal theory see Falk, supra note 1, at 11451 for legal criticism
of even the attempt to rely on a reprisal theory see CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL 53-57.
28. But the United States bears a heavy burden of responsibility for the inaction of
the United Nations as a consequence of the following considerations:
(1) Non-compliance with the proposals of the Secretary General, U Thant;
(2) Non-submission of the claim to act in self-defense to the Security Council
or General Assembly for serious community review;
(3) Refusal in early stages of conflict to seek a peaceful settlement through
negotiations;
(4) Alienation of China from ,the United Nations by its continuing exclusion from
the activities of the Organization;
(5) Ambiguity as to the sincerity of United States offers to negotiate, as a con-
sequence of coupling peace moves with steps up the escalation ladder. For scholarly
documentation see F. SCHURMANN, P. Scotr, & R. ZELN1K, THE PoLrIncs OF ESCALATION
IN VIETNAM (1966).
29. The important distinction is between the sort of legal order that exists for Types
I-III and for Type IV:
Types I-IIl are governed by second-order constraints self-imposed by sovereign states
and hased upon such quasi-objective sources of guidance and limitations as past practice,
public opinion, recommendation of impartial third-party actors such as the Secretary
General and the Pope, and well-defined international boundaries.
Type IV conflicts are governed by first-order constraints consisting of the determinations
of international institutions. First-order constraints are procedural out-comes on a
supranational level, whereas second-order constraints are substantive out-comes on a
national level.
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L The Rationale Restated in Support of a Type III Classification of
the Viet Nam War
Let me state clearly that when large-scale military participation by
the United States in the war began to take place-say 1963-it became
appropriate to treat the conflict as Type II. North Vietnamese large-
scale military participation on behalf of the N.L.F. accentuates this
classification of the war. My principal contention denies that the fac-
tual basis exists to warrant treating the Viet Nam War as belonging in
Type I (which would authorize extra-territorial defensive measures)
and, as a correlate denies that there exists a legal basis for extra-terri-
torial violence if the war is classified as Type II. However, it remains
important to consider the conflict in Viet Nam also as belonging origi-
nally in Type III so as to appreciate the principal role of the United
States in converting the war into Type II, such a conversion involving
conduct itself seriously at variance with my conception of the require-
ments of world order.2 0 It is also important to acknowledge that the
30. The transformation from Type III to Type 11 is a matter of policy rather than law
in any normal sense; "In sum, international law has never been equipped to intervene
in civil war situations." Friedmann, Intervention, Civil War and the Rle of International
Law, 1965 PROc. Am. Soc'y INT'L L. 67, 74. There are no criteria that are usefully avail-
able to identify prohibited interventions, although some efforts have been recently made
to prohibit overt and direct military participation. See Farer, lntervention in Cil Wars:
A Modest Proposal, 67 COLuM. L. REv. 266 (1967). The real issues of policy confronting
the United States are the degree to which it reacts to revolutionary events in the Afro-
Asian and Latin American countries as properly hostile to its interests. For critical accounts
of this aspect of, foreign policy, see E. STiLU rAN & W. PFAFF, Powat AND In t'oTcE,
15-59, 184-226 (1966); H. ZiNN, VmrrNA: THE LOcic OF Wrn AwA 37-50 (1967);
and see T. HAH, VmrNiA LoTus IN A SA OF FIPX 60-68 (1967) for the entangling of
nationalism and communism in the Viet Nam setting. For a pro-Administration judgment
of the American response to foreign revolutionary activity see W. Rostow, The Great
Transition: Tasks of the First and Second Postwar Generations, 56 DrP' STArr BuL.. 491
(1967).
The transformation from Type II to Type I is regulated by international law as it
implies violent conflict between sovereign states rather than within a sovereign state.
Initiating recourse to international violence, as distinct from interventionary violence,
requires the prior occurrence of an armed attack.
The consequences of this difference between shifting from III to II and from III or
II to I are to make different kinds of legal arguments appropriate in each context. At the
same time the difference in argument can be over-stated. A successful claim by a state to
act in a manner n.ot previously regarded as legal may itelf constitute authoritative state
practice that can be relied upon in the future by others, thereby transforming what had
once been regarded as prohibited into what comes to be regarded as permissible. In a
context where legal expectations have been regarded as well-fixed policy, considerations
may incline an actor to posit a legislative claim, which if effectively asserted and accepted
by the wider community, tends to reshape legal expectations. In both contexts, therefore,
there is an unavoidable discretionary role played by the state with the capability to act
in different ways, but in the interventionary axis of decision (I1-II) there is less disposi-
tion to regard the decision to intervene as a weakening of legal order than in the armed
attack-self-defense axis of decision wherein legal expectation of fairly settled character
had been thought to exist, especially in view of the coordinated United States-Soviet
opposition to the French-British-Israeli recourse to overt violence in the Suez Campaign
of 1956.
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expectations of North Viet Nam and of the N.L.F. were likely formed
prior to the overt, large-scale intervention by the United States-that
is, when the conflict still belonged in the Type III category. Clarifying
the factual and legal reasons for regarding the early stages of the war
as Type III is very centially related, in my view, to the North Viet-
namese perception of what would constitute a reasonable outcome of
the Viet Nam war (regardless of its subsequent Type II history).
In considering the war in Viet Nam as belonging in Type III, es-
pecially in its early (pre-1963) phases, I intended a two-pronged argu-
ment: first a civil war between the two factions in the South and second,
a civil war between the Northern and Southern Zones. My argument
was essentially that in either case such a conflict should be determined
by the domestic balance of forces and, that, in the setting of Viet Nam
under either interpretation the anti-Saigon "entity" would have pre-
vailed but for American (that is, non-Vietnamese) military interven-
tion. My reasoning is essentially as follows: South Viet Nam had
evolved, despite the contrary intentions of the Geneva Settlement, as a
separate de facto political entity, and the N.L.F. emerged as a suffi-
ciently indigenous opposition movement to be deemed South Viet-
namese in character rather than as an "agent" or "puppet" of North
Viet Nam.31 In this circumstance the outcome df the N.L.F.-Saigon
struggle would have been an N.L.F. victory if both the United States
and North Viet Nam had remained out of the conflict, and the quan-
tum and phasing of United States and North Vietnamese aid to the
contending factions was imbalanced in favor of Saigon at every stage
subsequent to 1954. This interpretation of the early stages of the Viet-
namese conflict seems to enjoy the support of almost all disinterested
analysts.
32
The second prong of the Type III analysis conceives of the war in
31. To take seriously the issue of the autonomy of the N.L.F. it would be necessary
to compare its dependence on Hanoi with Saigon's dependence on Washington at the
various phases of the war. Cf. J. LAcouTuRE, VmrTNxs: BETwEEN Two TRucEs 61-119 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as LAcouTtRE]; KAMN 9& Lrwxs, esp. chapter entitled "Americanization of
the War," at 151-80. The autonomy of Saigon's discretion to terminate the war on its own
terms, as distinct from those insisted upon by Washington, is certainly as doubtful as Is
the autonomy of the N.L.F. to terminate the war on conditions at variance with those
insisted upon by Hanoi.
As to the extent of the American role at earlier preinsurgency stages of South Viet Nam's
history see E. HA~IIamR, THE STRUGGLE FOR INDO-CHINA 1940-1955 346-64 (1954.55); "How-
ever much American officials may have wished to regard southern Viet Nam as inde-
pendent, the fact and the promise of substantial American aid to the Nationalist regime
gave them such influence that in the fall of 1954 it was the United States, not the Viet-
namese people, who decided that Ngo Dinh Diem would continue to be Prime Minister
of southern Viet Nam." Id. 356.
32. LAcouTuRE 186-90; KAHIN & Lawis 127-206; THE MANsFIELD REPORT 11-12.
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Viet Nam as a civil war between South Viet Nam and North Viet Nam
waged for control of the state of Viet Nam. According to Professor
Moore, such a characterization of the war overlooks the separateness as
of 1960 of these two political entities, as well as the essential ambiguity
of the Geneva settlement, especially with regard to reunification. Pro-
fessor Moore, although sensitive to the particularities of the division
of Viet Nam in 1954, closely associates the status of Viet Nam with such
other divided countries as Korea, Germany, and China. Force across a
partition boundary is, as he properly points out, dangerous to world
peace since the de facto divisions express major unresolved conflicts be-
tween the Communist and non-Communist worlds. I challenge Pro-
fessor Moore's analysis on two principal grounds:
(1) The division in Viet Nam is not usefully comparable on policy
grounds to that of other divided countries;
(2) The defeat of the French by the Viet Minh as embodied in the
Geneva Settlement of 1954, the attitude of Saigon toward the Geneva
Accords, the Southern locus of the uprising, the small magnitude of
Northern interference as compared to the direct and indirect military
contributions of the United States Government to Saigon, the non-
viability of the regime in the South, and the national popularity of
Ho Chi Minh are factors that when taken into joint account make it
misleading to talk of "the aggression" of the North.
The Geneva Settlement: Face-Saving or Partition
Sir Anthony Eden, introducing his discussion of the Geneva Accords
of 1954 and his ideas for settling the present war in Viet Nam, has said
that
No agreement can be so drawn as to be proof against every malevo-
lent intention. That is why the observance of international engage-
ments is the first condition of any peaceful society. Once allow
treaties to be torn up with impunity and the world is headed for
trouble; violators soon have imitators.
33
It seems to me that Professor Moore is somewhat cavalier in explaining
away the United States' insistence on non-implementation of the elec-
tion provision in the Final Declaration by setting it off against a West-
ern preference for "partition" that was consistently denied both by the
language of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam
and of the Final Declaration.
34
33. A. EDEN, TowAm PEACE IN INDOCHINA 31 (1966).
34. See espedally Artides 1-9, 11-15, and 27 of Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities
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Ignoring the relevance of formal international engagements Profes-
sor Moore also supports the double standard whereby North Viet
Nam's alleged export of coercion through the N.L.F. is viewed as a
material breach of the Geneva Accords, whereas the United States' pro-
vision of military aid to Saigon, even though it admittedly preceded
North Vietnamese coercion, is approved of as a "permitted defensive
response." Moore facilely circumvents the determination by the Inter-
national Control Commission that both sides were guilty of violations
of the Geneva Accords which were not weighted as to relative serious-
ness, by asserting that "this neutral reporting proves little." 5 In fact,
for Professor Moore the determination of the I.C.C. proves less than
does the unsupported balancing of these two violations by an interested
party-namely, the United States Government. As elsewhere in his
analysis Professor Moore seems to endorse the discretionary compe-
tence of sovereign states at the expense either of binding international
arrangements or of the determinations of impartial machinery set up
to implement these arrangements. If the United States was so convinced
that its aid to Saigon was a permissible defensive response then why
did it not have this conclusion confirmed by the I.C.C. or by a recon-
vened Geneva Conference in the course of the years since 1954? There
is little doubt that from the time when the meetings were going on in
Geneva in 1954 the United States was determined to use its unilateral
military power to avoid the translation of the Viet Minh's military vic-
tory over the French in the First Indochina War into a corresponding
political victory. Once again it is worth quoting Anthony Eden, partly
because he was a principal participant at Geneva and partly because
his Tory credentials are so impeccable:
[Dulles] reiterated his fears that, in the event, France would be
compelled to depart from the seven points, and the United States
would then have to disassociate herself from the resulting agree-
ment. He said that even if the settlement adhered to the seven
points faithfully, the United States still could not guarantee it.30
I had already been warned by Bedell Smith that the United States
Government could not associate themselves with the final declara-
in Viet-Nam, July 20, 1954 and Articles 6 and 7 of the Final Declaration of Geneva Con-
ference, July 21, 1954, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS CoMi, 89th Cong. 1st Sess, BACKGROUND
INFORMATION RELATING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM, 28-42, 58-60 (rev. ed. June 16,
1965) [hereinafter cited as BACKGROUND INFORMATION.]
25. For example, paragraph 84 of the Sixth Interim Report of the ICC, December 11,
1955-July 10, 1956 reads as follows: "While the Commission has experienced difficulties
in North Vietnam, the major part of its difficulties has arisen in South Vietnam." 33 PARL.
SESSIONAL PA ERS, CMD. No. 31, at 30 (1956-57).
36. A. EDEN, FULL CIRCLE 156 (1960).
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tion. The most they could do was to issue a declaration taking note
of what had been decided and undertaking not to disturb the set-
dement. Since Dulles had been at least as responsible as ourselves
for calling the Geneva Conference, this did not seem to me reason-
able.32
There are two points to note. First, the United States' determination
from the outset not to be fully associated with the Geneva Settlement.
Why is this so if Professor Moore's view of its essential understanding
is correct? To answer this by saying that the United States wanted to
avoid ratifying the Communist acquisition of North Viet Nam is
hardly a sufficient explanation (even if it is a part of the story) in light
of Dulles' overall insistence upon preserving a free hand for American
action in the future. The second point, one that strikes me as legally
pertinent, is why it matters whether the United States approved of the
Geneva Accords or not. The parties to the conflict had full power to
settle it by agreement. It is rather far-fetched to contend that the
United States assent is needed to secure a formally binding arrange-
ment reached to end a war in which the United States was not itself a
direct participant.
Not everything complex is ambiguous. Professor Moore's argument
that the Geneva Settlement was ambiguous on the issue of unification
is unconvincing on several grounds:
(1) The election provisions of the Geneva Accords are explicit as to
date, auspices, and preconditions;3
(2) The fact that the Geneva Declaration was unsigned does not
seriously detract from its character as a binding legal instrument;39
37. Id. 159-60.
38. Falk, supra note 1, at 1129 (and authorities cited in note 31, supra); CO.SULTATnE
CouNciL 43-48; KAmN & LEwms 52-55, 80-87; 2 fBuTrrNGER 839-40; the most detailed
support for regarding the failure to hold the elections promised by Article 7 of the Final
Declaration for July 1956 as frustrating Hanoi's sincere understanding of the Geneua
Settlement is contained in a well-researched monograph, Weinstein, Vietnam's Unheld
Elections (1966) (Data Paper No. 60, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell Univ.); cf. Lacouture,
The "Face" of the Viet Cong, WAR/P-AcE REPORT, May, 1966, at 7, 8: "One cannot say
... that the North resigned itself, with only pro forina protestations, to Diem's refusal
to hold the elections that had been legally set for July, 1956. During his trip to Ne7
Delhi in 1955 as well as in three separate attempts at the end of 1955 and at the beginning
of 1956, Pham Van Dong, the present premier of North Vietnam, attempted to implement
the provisions of the Geneva agreement. He even offered to delay the elections on condi-
tion that Saigon pledge to allow them. It was the great powers-the U.S.S.R. and Peking
included-who forgot the Geneva recommendations, not Hanoi, which found itself for
the second time 'cheated'." For a full account of the first time Hanoi was "cheated" see
HAMERm, supra note 31, at 148-202; a briefer account is contained in KtniN & LxWis 25-28.
39. See KAHIN & LEWis 51 (and citations contained in note 7 therein), including
reference to Article 3(b) and commentary thereto as contained in U.N. Doc. A/16309 (1966).
The fact that the United States withheld its oral assent from the Final Declaration and
attached a Declaration somewhat at variance with Article 7 does not alter the legal
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(3) The refusal of the Saigon regime to accept the Geneva Accords
does not relieve it of the obligation to comply as France had the ca-
pacity that it explicitly sought to exercise, to bind its "successor"; 40
(4) Experienced and impartial observers generally agree that (a)
unification by means of elections was part of the Geneva Settlement
and (b) elections, if held, would have resulted in the consolidation
of Viet Nam under the control of Hanoi;
41
(5) The United States was from the beginning manifestly discon-
tented with the Geneva solution, refused to endorse the outcome as a
party, and set about almost immediately thereafter to undo the fulfill-
ment of its terms.
42
Moore advises analysts to consider the total context of Geneva and
yet he neglects these critical factors. He is correct in pointing to a cer-
tain aura of ambiguity connected with securing the compliance of
Saigon with a settlement that was expected to extinguish its sphere of
influence. It is also appropriate, as Moore suggests, to acknowledge the
subsequent de facto sovereignty of both North and South Viet Nam,
regardless of the intentions at Geneva in 1954.
43
expectations created among the real parties in interest-the French and the Viet Minh,
For text of the United States Declaration, see BACKGROUND INFORMATION, 61: "In connec-
tion with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Viet-Nam my
Government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made
in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows:
In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to
achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that
they are conducted fairly.
With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Vlet-Nam [lao
Dai], the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to
determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would
hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any
departure from its traditional position."
It is obvious that the United States alters the terms of Article 7 by the conspicuots omls.
sion of a definite date upon which elections should be held in Viet Nam and by the call for
United Nations supervision. It is also clear that the refusal to give oral assent to the
Final Declaration and the reference in the United States Statement to its refusal "to
join in an arrangement" which "would hinder" its election policy indicates the serious
intention of the other participants to take seriously the terms of Article 7. It is one
thing for the United States and the Bao Dai regime to disassociate themselves from the
Final Declaration, it is quite another to contend that the enforceability and centrality
of the election provision was in any respect reduced thereby.
40. This conclusion appears to be persuasively established in Partan, Legal Aspects of
the Vietnam Conflict, 46 B.UJ,. REV. 281, 289-92 (1966).
41. See the authorities cited at note 38 supra for relevant references, especially Wein.
stein. A typical comment is in B. FALL, THE Two Vmr-NAmaS (2d rev. ed. 1967), at 291,
who writes that "On the grounds of its nonsignature, South Viet-Nam refused to hold
elections by July 1956, since this would have meant handing over control of the South
to Ho Chi Minh."
42. Cf. B. FALL Tnm Two Virr-NAms 229-33 (2d rev. ed. 1967); KAHIN 9- LEwts 57.63; 2
BUtrMNGER 834-42.
43. The expectations created as of 1954 remain relevant to the perception by North
Viet Nam of what constitutes a reasonable outcome of the Second Indochina War, and
influences the formulation of minimum negotiating demands.
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It would consume too much space to refute Moore's interpretation
of the Geneva Accords on a point-to-point basis especially as this task
has already been done effectively by other authors.44 I would, however,
suggest the weakness of Moore's position by reference to the long pas-
sage he approvingly quotes from a book by Victor Bator. In this passage
Bator argues that the Geneva Accords really intended "partition" and
that this position is borne out by "the detailed accounts of Bernard B.
Fall, Jean Lacouture, and Philippe Devillers."45 Here is what Devillers
actually thought about the Geneva Settlement:
The demarcation line was to be purely provisional; the principle
of Vietnamese unity was not questioned, and the idea of partition
was officially rejected with indignation by both sides....
The disproportion between the monolithic power of the Vietminh,
armed and with the halo of victory, and the almost derisory weak-
ness of the so-called Nationalist Viet Nam was such that in the
summer of 1954 almost no one thought that the two years' delay
won by M. Mendes-France at Geneva could be anything but a re-
spite in which to salvage as much as possible from the wreck. At
the end of the period, unity would certainly be restored, this time
to the benefit of the Vietminh, the basic hypothesis then acknowl-
edged by all being that the Geneva Agreements would definitely
be implemented (emphasis supplied).4
Devillers' position has recently been reaffirmed by Professors Kahin
and Lewis in their careful and fully documented account of the Geneva
Conference. These authors describe Geneva as the event that "officially
registered France's defeat by the Vietminh and provided her with a
face-saving means of disengagement."47 In this regard Kahin and Lewis
aver that it was the "promise of elections that constituted an essential
condition insisted upon by the Vietminh at Geneva." Their reasoning
is well worth quoting:
44. See K.~N &- LEi s 43-65; also relevant on many points is D. LA.CASTER. THE
EMANCIPATION OF FRENCH INDOCHINA 813-58 (1961).
45. In a long and significant scholarly review article, itself not hostile to the United
States' role in Viet Nam, John T. McAlister says of Bator's longer interpretation of the
Geneva Conference in V. BATOR, Vx-r NA.: A DIPLOMATIC TRAcEDY (1965) that it "is an
emotional and polemical book making no claims to be a scholarly work." MeAlister, The
Possibilities for Diplomacy in Southeast Asia 19 WoRLD PoLMcs 258. 269 (1967); Bator's
article from The Reporter has been reprinted along with a series of other strongly pro-
Administration articles drawn from the magazine and reflecting its partisan editorial
slant in Viet Nam-VIENAm: WiiY-A CoLLroN OF REMORTs AND CoM,.t*"s Fatm T1lE
REPO Rm (1966). It is, hence, strange to rely upon an occasional piece by Bator, were it
not the case that the more trustworthy commentators in the Geneva Conference all cast
doubt upon "the partition" hypothesis.
46. Devillers, The Struggle for Unification of Vietnam, Tim CIUNA QUarT.Y, Jan.-
March 1962, 2-3.
47. KAImN & Lmvis 43.
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France was prepared to pay the political price of that condition in
order to get the armistice that she so urgently wanted. Her suc-
cessor [in Saigon] would be obliged to abide by that condition or
face the certain resumption of hostilities. The reason for this is
patent: when a military struggle for power ends on the agreed
condition that the competition will be transferred to the political
plane, the side that violates the agreed condition cannot legiti-
mately expect that the military struggle will not be resumed. 48
Professor Moore relies upon the memoirs of Anthony Eden to estab.
lish "that the real core of the settlement, at least from a Western stand-
point, was partition of Viet Nam. . . ." (1059) These memoirs are
too imprecise to clarify legal analysis and are internally inconsistent,40
although they do provide considerable insight into the divergence of
the American position from that of the other Western powers at Ge-
neva in 1954. Eden, who holds very intense anti-Communist views, is
especially convincing in his account of the effort that he made to dis-
courage the United States from undermining the whole project of a
conference to end the first Indochina war.50 The United States was
lobbying at Geneva in support of a collective Western intervention in
support of the French, support that the French no longer desired. Eden
indicates that he was distressed to learn from a French diplomat about
an official document in which the United States secretly proposed to
the French that military intervention in Indochina occur "either after
the failure of Geneva, or earlier if the French so desired, and he em-
phasized that the American preference had been clearly expressed for
the earlier date" (emphasis supplied).51 It seems to me that a fair-
48. Id. 57.
49. Anthony Eden seems primarily concerned with obtaining a Western negotiating
consensus that would enable the war in Indochina to be brought to an end. There is no
detailed interpretation given by the terms of the Geneva settlement and there is every
indication that Eden thought that the election provisions would be carried out, despite
the intra-Allied discussion in terms of "partition." A. EDEN, FULL CmcLE 158-59 (1960).
It is very strange to argue that the negotiating hopes of the United States, which were
not to any degree reflected in the language or terms of the Accords themselves, should
be given any weight in construing treaty-type obligations that are unambiguous on their
face. It is an elementary rule of treaty interpretation that one consults the context of
the agreement only to the extent that the provisions themselves are unclear. Even If the
Accords do not qualify as treaties in the strict sense their content was affirmed In a
solemn and formal manner. In any event, although the rhetoric of partition does
imply a permament separation of Viet Nam into two separate states, it is quite con-
sistent with a temporary period of partition followed by elections seeking reunification.
Only such an interpretation brings consistency into the Eden accounting. For the most
persuasive skeptical view of the Geneva Accords-one that puts a curse on both houses-
see 2 BUTrINGES 978-81.
50. A. EDEN, FULL CIRCLE 120-63 (1960).
51. Id. 134; cf. id. 93, 103, 117, 126-27 (for a sense of Eden's perception of
American attitudes toward the Geneva Conference). Buttinger's account of the American
attempts to rally support for military intervention is one of the most complete and
.1116
Vol. 76: 1095, 1967
International Law: A Response
minded reading of the Eden memoirs would emphasize the degree to
which talk of "partition" may have been designed to mollify the United
States apprehensions about the Conference. In any event, if "partition"
was the bargain, it was nowhere reflected in the Geneva Accords that
resulted from the Conference. Why not?
The partition hypothesis also does not reconcile easily with Eden's
evident feeling that the election provision in the Final Declaration was
to be taken seriously:
The Communists insisted that elections should be held during
1955 in Vietnam, whereas the French maintained, I thought
rightly, that it would take at least two years for the country to be
restored to a condition in which elections would be possible.r
I conclude that (1) partition was not written into the Geneva Accords
and that (2) unification by elections in July, 1956 was the essential
political bargain struck at Geneva in exchange for a regroupment of
the fighting forces into two zones and the withdrawal to the North of
the Vietminh armies. This interpretation of the Geneva Accords is
crucial for an interpretation of the relevance of the post-1954 events,
especially of the extent to which one emphasizes or disregards the non-
implementation of the election provision. My principal contention is
that once it became clear that the election provision would not be car-
ried out recourse to coercion by Hanoi was both predictable and per-
missible in either of the two Type III variants-the N.L.F. versus
Saigon or North Viet Nam versus South Viet Nam. On this basis I find
it highly misleading and false to analogize the evidence of North Viet-
namese support for the insurgency in the South with the massive attack
by North Korea on South Korea in 1950. It is false even if (which is
hardly possible) one accepts the State Department's "white papers" as
accurate descriptions of the North Vietnamese role in the early stage
of the conflict in South Viet Nam. Among other considerations distin-
guishing Korea are the following: the effort of Hanoi proceeded against
a quite opposite political background, it was based on much more am-
biguous evidence of coercion, and the coercion was of a such small
scale that it could not have resulted in any substantial disturbance had
not a revolutionary potential preexisted in South Viet Nam.sr
accurate, 2 BUTrINGER 797-844; he writes that "the moves that Radford, Dulles, and
Nixon made during April 1954, to stop Communism in Indochina arc among the saddest
chapters of U.S. diplomacy." Id. 819.
52. Id. 158, 159; see aso A. EDEN, TOWARD PEACE IN INDOCHINA 38 (1966).
53. E.g., Feldman, Violence and volatility: The Lihelihood of Rczolution, in H.
EcsTmN, ed., INTERNAL WAR 111-29 (1964).
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Viet Nam cannot be regarded as relevantly similar to the other di-
vided countries of China,54 Korea, or Germany. Although Korea and
Germany differ significantly from one another as divided countries, the
political "settlement" in each case consisted of a reciprocal acceptance
of partition, at least until a more satisfactory political settlement could
be agreed upon as to reunification. Until such a second or new political
settlement emerges, if ever, the use of coercion in any form to achieve
a favorable military settlement of the reunification issue is, as Professor
Moore properly indicates, a dangerous disturbance of world order, a
disturbance that entitles the victim entity to claim full defensive rights
and one that entails the gravest consequences; the Korean War illus-
trates and vindicates the principle that frontiers within divided states
enjoy at least the same sanctity as frontiers between undivided states.
The Saigon regime cannot invoke the sanctity of the seventeenth paral-
lel in the same persuasive manner as the Seoul regime invoked the
sanctity of the thirty-eighth parallel. The political settlement at Ge-
neva in 1954 provided a formula for the nullification (rather than one
for the maintenance) of the division. In Viet Nam Saigon's establish-
ment, rather than the subsequent attempt at its removal, of a political
frontier at the seventeenth parallel represented the coercive challenge
to world order.55
In this spirit it is worth reexamining Professor Moore's central
policy test in the Viet Nam setting-namely, the prohibition by inter-
national law of coercion as a strategy of major change. On one level
such a policy is an essential ingredient of minimum world order in the
nuclear age. But peace cannot be divorced from minimum expectations
of fair play on related matters. The Geneva Conference confirmed the
results of a long anti-colonial war won at great cost to Vietnamese so-
ciety by the armies of Ho Chi Minh. 6 The achievement of national
independence is a goal of such importance in the Afro-Asian world that
it clearly takes precedence for these countries over generalized prohibi-
54. It can be persuasively argued, I think, that Formosa is wrongly conceived of as
an integral part of China. Therefore, China is not "a divided country" at all, but there
are two countries each of which is entitled to sovereign status. For a complete argument
to this effect see L. CHEN & H. LASSWELL, FO"IOSA, CHINA, AND TE UNITED NATIoNg,
FORMOSA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD COiNIUNITY (to be published in 1967).
55. See B. FALL, THE Two ViEr-NAMs 231-32 (2d rev. ed. 1967); the effort to build.up
the military strength of the Saigon regime was coupled with its refusal to allow the
election provision of the Geneva settlement to be carried out. To defend the seventeenth
parallel as if it were an international boundary was itself tantamount to an Illegal
effort at splitting a state into two parts, an effort frequently productive of severe civil
strife. It is only necessary to recall the American Civil War or the post-1960 efforts of
Katanga to split off from the Congo.
56. See HAMER, supra note 31.
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tions on force or rules about non-intervention. 7 The Geneva Accords
are not just an international agreement about which a dispute arose,
but a formalized acknowledgment of a political outcome that it is
reasonable to suppose could have been attained legitimately by the
Vietminh in 1954 through military means.58 In effect, the Accords were
a political bargain struck by the French as an alternative to continuing
the appalling destruction of lives and property. To cast aside this po-
litical bargain is to undermine severely the security of solemn inter-
national agreements and to put in jeopardy collective procedures for
pacific settlement."
My conclusion, then, is that Professor Moore has not persuasively
demonstrated that the use of coercion across the seventeenth parallel
by North Viet Nam should have been regarded as coercion across an
international boundary. I wish to argue only that it was reasonable for
Hanoi, given the stakes and outcome of the first Indochina war, to re-
gard Saigon's intransigence on the issue of elections as a material
breach of the Accords allowing it to act on the basis of the status quo
ante 1954: in my terms choosing this option would result in an example
of Type III conflict, a situation of internal conflict for control of all of
Viet Nam in which outside participation on behalf of either faction is
"intervention," at least in the sense of interfering with the process of
self-determination. °
Despite its plausibility from the perspective of law, there are three
problems with this interpretation:
(I) Hanoi has not really contended that the action of Saigon nullifies
the Geneva Accords; on the contrary, Hanoi continues to urge imple-
mentation and compliance;
57. For example, the African states overtly proclaim their intention to resort to
force against the countries of Southern Africa to end colonialism and racism. The legal
status of this claim is considered in Falk, The New States and International Order,
118 RFctuiL DES Cous (1966).
58. After Den Bien Phu the only way to prevent a total Vietminlh victory would
have been a massive United States military intervention, that included combat troops;
as it was, even Anthony Eden points out that the French were the recipients of at least
nine times as much foreign support from the United States as the Vietminh received
from China. A. EoEN, FuLL Citcr. 126-27 (1960).
59. The refusal of the United States to take the Geneva Accords of 1954 more seriously
as the terms of settlement may help partly to account for the reluctance of Hanoi to
negotiate with the United States. Of course, there are independent reasons to suppose
that the United States may not be sincere about its v.arious offers to negotiate an end
to the Viet Nam war. See Draper, Vietnam: How Not to Negotiate, NEv Yorm Rmr-i
oF Booms, May 4, 1967, at 17; Draper's criticism of the Government is so impressive
because of his earlier support of the United States' anti-Castro foreign policy. T. Da"nm,
CAsrnoiss THEoRY A PRACnCE (1965). Cf. KAtoN & Iiwis 207-37.
60. Quincy Wright has been a consistent advocate of this position. See Wright. Legal
Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, 60 Amt. J. INL, L. 750 (1966); Wright, United States
Intervention in the Lebanon, 53 Ams. J. INT'L L. 112 (1959).
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(2) South Viet Nam has existed as a separate political entity for more
than twelve years and has been accorded diplomatic recognition by
many foreign governments; the consequence is a condition of statehood
with all of the normal defensive prerogatives;
(8) During the last five years third-powers have become increasingly
involved on both sides in the Viet Nam War; South Korea, Thailand,
Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Soviet Union, and China
are the principal third-party participants as of April, 1967.
As I have indicated at the outset of this section the war in Viet Nam
now belongs in Type II; the functions of clarifying the argument that
it was originally an example of Type III and that the United States
should have left it that way are to indicate the reasonable basis of a
settlement and to emphasize the unilateral role of the United States
in shifting the war to an internationally more serious category of
conflict.6
1
II. The Rationale Restated in Support of a Type II Classification of
the Viet Nam War
To classify the Viet Nam war as a Type II conflict implies consider-
ing the war as a variety of civil strife in which two domestic factions,
each of which receives substantial assistance from foreign states, are
struggling for control of a sovereign state. I maintain that international
law then requires that belligerent conduct remain within the territorial
limits of South Viet Nam. The United States Government officially
repudiates this interpretation of the war and insists that the violent
conflict is properly viewed as "an armed attack" by North Viet Nam
upon South Viet Nam. South Viet Nam is thus entitled to act in self-
defense, including, to the extent necessary, the commission of acts of
war in North Viet Nam. In my terms, the United States Government
has inappropriately characterized "the facts" as vindicating a Type I
classification.
62
61. As a conflict moves from Type III toward Type II it tends to become more
dangerous to international peace and security; as it proceeds from Type 11 to Type I It
tends to become even more dangerous other things being equal. Therefore, the United
States' role in transforming the conflict from Type III to Type I without seriously
attempting at a Type IV classification is to follow a path destructive of world order
in relation to the civil strife-revolution phenomena occurring throughout the Afro-Asian
world.
62. The objective of establishing two categories of internationi conflict, Type I and
Type II, is to underline the importance in policy and in law to distinguish between
the Korea-type situation and the Viet Nam-type situation. Analytic categories are Ideal
types; there is no comparable clarity in real-world situations. Nevertheless, the ambi-
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Professor Moore agrees with the Government that the war in Viet
Nam belongs in Type I, but he goes further by arguing that even if
the facts warrant a Type II classification there are no legal restrictions
that necessarily confine the war to territorial boundaries and that, in
the context of Viet Nam, the air and sea strikes against North Viet-
namese territory have been legally reasonable. There are thus two
broad sets of questions to which Professor Moore and I give different
ansvers:
(1) Is North Viet Nam "intervening" in "civil strife" going on in
South Viet Nam or is North Viet Nam "attacking" South Viet Nam?
Who decides, by what criteria, and subject to what conditions?
(2) If North Viet Nam is regarded as merely "intervening" in civil
strife, does international law prohibit South Viet Nam and states allied
with her from committing war acts against the territory of North Viet
Nam?
As Professor Moore effectively argues, South Viet Nam's de facto
sovereignty makes it important to analyze the legal rights of the Saigon
regime on the assumption that South Viet Nam is a sovereign state, as
entitled as any other to act in self-defense and to receive military assis-
tance. Moore's interpretation of North Viet Nam's role depends on
two sets of assertions; neither of which I accept as to fact or law:
(1) The nature of North Viet Nam's military assistance to the N.L.F.
and the political objectives motivating it constitute "an armed attack"
upon South Viet Nam;
(2) The United States assistance to the Saigon regime, including
bombing North Viet Nam, is a reasonable and lawful exercise of the
right of self-defense.
My argument as formulated in the first article is that the conflict in
South Viet Nam closely resembles other instances of prolonged civil
strife in which substantial intervention by foreign countries on behalf
of both the insurgent and the incumbent faction has taken place. I re-
gard two assertions as legally determinative of the argument being
made by Professor Moore:
(1) Covert assistance, even of a substantial nature, to an insurgent
faction does not constitute an armed attack;
(2) Counter-intervention on behalf of an incumbent faction may not
extend the conflict beyond its existing territorial boundaries.
guities and antagonistic misperceptions that are likely to accompany a conflict of the
Viet Nam variety make it very important for states to limit their involvement to the
boundaries of the society wherein the violence is located.
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This reasoning seemed directly applicable to the situation in Viet
Nam with the consequence that the extension of the war to the terri.
tory of North Viet Nam by the United States is deemed to be a viola-
tion of international law.
Professor Moore, if I understand him correctly, argues:
(1) My Type II paradigm confuses what the rules of international
law ought to be with what the rules actually are;
(2) The weight of legal authority supports Saigon's discretion to treat
North Viet Nam's aid to the N.L.F. as an armed attack and thereby
authorizes defensive measures undertaken against North Vietnamese
territory;
(3) Bombing North Viet Nam has been a reasonable defensive mea-
sure for the United States to undertake on behalf of South Viet Nam
in view of the facts of attack and the law authorizing a proportionate
response to it;
(4) The policy interests at stake are more consistent with such dis-
cretion than with the territorial limitations embodied in the Type II
paradigm. Thus Professor Moore concludes there is "greater reason
[than not] to believe both as a matter of the is and the ought that the
bombing of the North is a permissible defensive response."
The Distinction between "Is" and "Ought" in the Context of 'iet
Nam: The Doctrinal Level of Discourse
I find it peculiar that Professor Moore argues, on the one hand, that
the ambiguity of the legal and factual setting in Viet Nam makes it
essential to assess the respective rights and duties of the parties by ref-
erence to the world order policies at stake, and on the other that my
major line of legal analysis confuses what the law ought to be with
what the law is. It is peculiar that Professor Moore should rely on Hans
Kelsen, an arch-positivist, to support a critique that is explicitly
couched in terms of the sociological jurisprudence of Myres McDougal,
especially when Kelsen is invoked to show what is meant by the phrase
"armed attack" as it appears in Article 51 of the Charter. Of course,
Kelsen stresses the dichotomy between the "is" and the "ought," but
it is this stress that seems quite contrary to Moore's assertion, one that
I share, that international law is above all a process whereby actors
clarify through their conduct the world order policies that each deems
decisive in a particular context. For sake of clarity of discussion I shall
try, despite this jurisprudential ambivalence that I detect in Professor
Moore's critique, to respond directly to his analysis.
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Does Type II Embody a Preference About What International Law
Ought to Be?
Type II acknowledges the indeterminacy of international law with
respect to intervention and counter-intervention. There is no weight
of legal authority that can be crystallized in terms of rules commanding
universal, or even widespread respect. In fact, respectable and respon-
sible international jurists disagree as to whether international law:
(1) allows discrimination in favor of the incumbent;03
(2) requires impartiality as between the incumbent and the insur-
gent;4
(3) allows discrimination in favor of the just side.65
In face of this indeterminacy it seems useful to acknowledge the extent
of sovereign discretion as to participating in a foreign civil war. Inter-
national law does not provide authoritative rules of restraint, or stated
more accurately, it provides contradictory rules of restraint of appro.i-
mately equal standing. To invoke international law in this interna-
tional setting, then, is to argue about desirable policy or to communicate
in precise form what a particular state intends to claim; international
law does not, however, postulate rules of order the transgression of
which is illegal.
One of the authorities relied upon by Moore, Ian Brownlie, an in-
ternational lawyer in the strict positivist sense, gives the following sup-
port to insisting upon the applicability of territorial restriction in a
Type II situation:
When foreign assistance is given to the rebels, aid to the govern-
ment threatened is now generally assumed to be legal. Whether
63. E.g., Professor Moore (1080-93) and Garner, Questions of International Law in the
Spanish Civil War, 31 A.. J. INTI' L. 66 (1937); see also Borchard, "Neutrality" and
Civil Wars, 31 Ams. J. INT'L L. 304 (1937).
64. E.g., Wright, supra note 60, and W. HALL, IN-nATIONAL LAtv 347 (8th ed. 1924).
65. This position has been enunciated in its classical form by E. VATMhL, TE L.AW OF
NATIONS, Bk. 1I, § 56, 131 (1916). Although positive international law promotes either
discrimination in favor of the incumbent or impartiality, the practice of states increasingly
vindicates giving help to the side deemed "just." From the perspective of world order it
is crucial to develop community procedures to identify which side is "just." Such
procedures seem to work for those situations in which the principal rival states have
apparently converging interests, as with the unresolved problems of bringing independence
and racial equality to Rhodesia, South West Africa, Angola, Mozambique, and South
Africa. But where rival principal states disagree, as when civil strife beteen "radical"
and "conservative" elites occurs in the developing countries, then the determination of
which side is "just" is likely to generate competitive interventions if the contradictory
perceptions are acted upon. The Communist ideas of support for wars of national libera-
tion are in conflict with American thinking on the legitimacy of helping any anti-
Communist regime sustain itself against Communist opposition. In a world of antagonistic
ideologies it is dangerous to maintain complete discretion on the national level to identify
which faction is "just"; but, equally, in a world of insistent legislative demands it is
dangerous to preclude discrimination in favor of an insurgency that is deemed just by
the overwhelming consensus of international society. One approach for Cold War issues
and another for Southern African issues seems imperative at this point.
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this is permitted in relation to minor disturbances caused by for-
eign propaganda or other forms of interference is an open ques-
tion. It is also uncertain as to whether the foreign assistance must
be a decisive element in the imminent and serious threat to the
existing government or whether it is sufficient if foreign assistance
is a contributory cause. Finally, foreign assistance to the govern-
ment will be confined to measures on the territory of the request-
ing state unless the foreign aid to the rebels amounts in fact and
law to an "armed attack" (emphasis supplied) 0
It is worth noticing that Brownlie attributes uncertainty to the positive
law in this area, but more immediately, it is important to take account
of his reliance upon territoriality as a limiting criterion. Brownlie re-
inforces the quoted passage in the course of his discussion of claims to
use force in self-defense against alleged aggression:
It is suggested that so far as possible defensive measures should be
confined to the territory of the defending state and the hostile
forces themselves unless there is clear evidence of a major invasion
across a frontier which calls for extensive military operations
which may not be confined merely to protecting the frontier line.
The precise difficulty in the case of indirect aggression is to avoid
major breaches of the peace of wide territorial extent arising from
defensive measures based on vague evidence of foreign com-
plicity. 7
It seems reasonable to regard Brownlie's discussion as a generalization
of past state practice that reflects international law. My Type II bound-
ary rule places an outer limit on the discretion of the sovereign state
and is precisely the kind of quasi-objective limit that is so crucial for
the maintenance of world order.
It is correct, as Professor Moore argues, that if the insurgent faction
is the "agent" of the outside state then it is permissible for the victim
state to respond at the source by regarding the apparent insurgency as
an armed attack. But such a response requires a real demonstration of
66. I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 327 (1963).
See also Pinto, Les R~gles du Droit International Concernant la Guerre Civile, RECUEI1L
DEs Couns 451, 544-48 (1965).
67. Id. 373, "Indirect aggression and the incursions of armed bands can be countered
by measures of defence which do not involve military operations across frontiers." Id. at
279. A recent Western visitor to North Viet Nam confirms the distinction between inter-
vention in the South and bombing of the North as vital to the North Vietnamese per-
ception of themselves as victims of United States aggression:
Their [North Viet Nam] position is that the bombing of the North is a separate act
of aggression from fighting in the South. While they might understand and tolerate,
although disapprove, American intervention in the South on behalf of the Saigon
government, they regard the bombing of the North as an unconscionable act of
aggression against a sovereign nation.
Ashmore, supra note 21, at 17, 12, 14.
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instigation and control, as distinct from either a mere allegation or
evidence of some assistance to a faction that appears to possess an inde-
pendent character and objectives.
International law is not really indefinite on this subject. A state is
not permitted to use sustained military force against a foreign country
unless the justification is overwhelmingly clear.08 It is difficult to estab-
lish unilaterally that covert uses of force by an external enemy can ever
constitute an ample justification. It is difficult to distinguish a pretext
from a justification, especially as the status of assistance to either side
in an ongoing civil war seems legally equivalent. That is, one side may
discriminate in favor of the incumbent, whereas the other side may
discriminate in favor of "the just" faction, and both possess an equal
legal basis.69 In such a situation any serious concern with the policies
of conflict minimization would insist, at least, that neither side has the
discretion to extend the war to foreign territory.
The dynamics of internal war are such that both sides must, as the
war progresses, almost certainly seek increasing external support to
maintain their position in the struggle; if the scene of the internal war
is a minor country then it is increasingly likely that both factions will
become dependent for their political leadership upon a larger external
ally.70 Insurgent dependence on external support is not by itself proof
of an aggressive design on the part of the supporter state. This depen-
dence on an external ally is normally only an expression of the chang-
ing ratios of influence between the benefactor and recipient of military
68. Action and reaction sequences involving "incidents" have not been regulated in
any very dear and definite way by international law. States interact by claim and counter-
claim and the degree of legality is very largely dependent on the general impression of the
reasonableness of the action undertaken by the contending states. The Gulf of Tonkin
incident was a characteristic illustration of this process. The legality of the United
States response depends primarily on (a) the reality of the provocation and (b) the pro-
portionality of the response. For useful background as to practice, policy, and law
in this kind of setting of sporadic violence see F. GROB, Tim PnAnvrr oF "WAn A 'D
PFACE: A Sruny IN LAW, HI9ORY, AND PoLrnes (1949).
69. This flexibility of international law is confirmed by the discretion states posess
to accord or withhold recognition from a partially successful insurgency. L. C= , Tim
INTERNATIONAL LAW oF RE coGNrMoN (Green ed. 1951). It is not necessary for recognition
to be accorded in an express or formal manner. De facto recognition arising out of inter-
course between the third-party state and the anti-government faction is sufficient pro-
vided the facts of the civil war justify the inference of dual sovereignty; i.e., each faction
governs a portion of the society and this situation is likely to continue for a considerable
period of time. As Lauterpacht concludes, "It is not contrary to international law to
recognize the insurgents as a government exercising de facto authority over the territory
under its control." H. LAUIJERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN IN'E NATIoAL LAw 294 (1947). See
generally id. 279-94.
70. The process by which an internal war is internationalized is well-depicted in
Modeiski, The International Relations of Internal War, in IN-Yr ATRONAL AP=CS oF
CtviL S-miE 14-44 (J. Rosenau ed. 1964).
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assistance on both sides as the conflict progresses to higher magnitudes,
It would be detrimental to world order to treat such ratios as equiva.
lent to an armed attack by one state on another and prior to the war
in Viet Nam there had been neither serious juridical support nor diplo-
matic practice that would justify treating assistance to an insurgent as
an armed attack. In fact, for world order purposes, bombing North
Viet Nam has to be appraised as if it were seeking to establish a new
legal precedent upon which other states could and should subsequently
rely.7
1
Professor Moore regards as "mysterious" my assertion that bombing
North Viet Nam is simultaneously both
(1) a violation of international law and
(2) a law-creating precedent.
It may be mysterious, but it is a mystery locked into the international
legal process. As a consequence of the absence of a legislature in inter-
national society, the assertion of a claim by a state to act in a certain
way, if supported by an appeal to the policies and rules of law and if
effectively asserted in practice, is both a violation of law as measured
by prior expectations about what was permissible in a given situation
and a precedent that can be subsequently invoked to legitimate future
conduct of a similar sort. This can be stated more concretely by asking
about whether prior to the war in Viet Nam a response against the
territory of the state assisting an insurgent faction was regarded to
be as permissible as it might be in some subsequent war of the Viet
Nam variety.72 Certainly, the precedent of Viet Nam will provide
valuable support for any victim state that attacks foreign territory on
71. The international law applicable to Type II situations is subject to "legislative"
modification by principal states asserting new claims in an effective fashion and defending
their assertion by an appeal to international law. It would be very difficult for the United
States to oppose the legal argument it has developed to support its claim to bomb
North Viet Nam, In this respect, my criticism of the Meeker legal rationale for "self-
defense" in Viet Nam is more that it constitutes bad "legislation" than that it is "a
violation." But cf. Meeker, supra note 23. Often a precedent established for one context
can be successfully invoked for different objectives in a series of subsequent contexts. Thils
general process is very ably depicted in connection with the activities of the International
Labor Organization by Ernst Haas. See E. HAAs, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE, esp. 381-425
(1964) (describing precedent-creation in a cold war context later being invoked in anti-
colonial and anti-racist contexts with regard to "freedom of association').
72. The United States has not even restricted bombing to certain specific objectives
related directly to the Vietcong war effort-for Instance, the specific interdiction of supplies
and infiltrators or destruction of staging areas. President Johnson explicitly includes
punishment as one of three principal objectives of bombing North Viet Nam: "[Wje
sought to impose on North Viet Nam a cost for violating its international agreements."
President Reviews U.S. Position on Bombing of North Viet-Nam, 56 Drx"r STATE BULL,
514, 515 (1967). For a description of the impact of bombing on North Viet Nara see H.
SALISBURY, BEHIND THE LINES-HANOI DECEMBER 23-JANuARY 7 (1967).
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the ground that it was substantially assisting the insurgent. Other
international settings in which a legally dubious claim was converted
by its successful assertion into a legally authoritative precedent can be
mentioned-for instance, testing nuclear weapons on the high seas,
orbiting reconnaissance satellites, and imposing criminal responsibility
upon individuals who lead their country in an aggressive war. Professor
Moore once again appears hesitant to accept the full jurisprudential
implications of the McDougalian orientation that he advocates: if there
is a process of law-creation at work in international society, then the
distinction between a violation and a law-creating precedent is one of
perspective and prediction, but not logic.73
Is North Viet Nam's Assistance to the N.L.F. "an Armed Attack?" The
Factual Level of Discourse
Only if North Viet Nam's assistance to the N.L.F. can be considered
an armed attack, is proportionate self-defense available to Saigon and
its allies.
Professor Moore argues that North Viet Nam is guilty of an armed
attack on South Viet Nam for the following principal reasons:
(1) A substantial body of scholarly opinion holds that Hanoi actually
initiated, as well as assisted, the insurgency;
(2) Hanoi exercises control over the activities of the N.L.F.;
(3) Hanoi's principal objective is to reunify Viet Nam under its con-
trol; therefore, its assistance is, in effect, a project for the territorial
expansion of North Viet Nam at the expense of South Viet Nam.
These issues concern the quality, quantity, and phasing of Hanoi's
role. Reasonable men disagree about the facts. Many observers, espe-
cially in the United States, regard the resolution of these factual ques-
tions as critical to their assessment of whether the United States has
responded in a lawful manner. For purposes of my own analysis I
would argue that even if the facts are accepted in the form that Pro-
fessor Moore presents them the conflict in Viet Nam is appropriately
treated as Type II. I would additionally argue, however, that Professor
73. This process is summarized in part by the maxim ex faclis js orltur; without
legislative organs and without a general conference procedure, the growth of international
law reflects the process by which claims and counter-claims interact, especially if principal
states are participants.
It is, of course, possible to distinguish an arbitrary recommendation of a particular
author as to preferred regulatory schemes from a reasoned application of pre-existing
community legal policies to a controversial fact situation. In the former case one is
dealing with a criticism of the legal order, whereas in the latter one is concerned with
an application of law, albeit an application that interprets obligations in light of policy
preference.
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Moore's construction of the facts relies on the reporting of biased
observers. Furthermore, I would contend that it is inappropriate to
appraise Hanoi's connection with the N.L.F. without taking into
account Washington's connection with the Saigon regime, especially
after the insurgency had succeeded in establishing itself as the govern-
ment for many areas of South Viet Nam.
Construing the Controverted Facts
The ambiguity of the facts in a situation in which civil strife has
been allegedly abetted by external assistance is one reason why it is
important to regulate the scope of conflict by objective limits. It is
obviously easy for any interested state to manipulate the evidence
to vindicate any response. The gradual emergence of a serious struggle
for the control of South Viet Nam gave the Saigon regime and the
United States an adequate opportunity to establish the facts by im-
partial procedures and to have recourse to international institutions
to vindicate the legal inferences of "aggression," and later, "armed
attack," that were drawn from the facts. It is important to realize that
the United States made very little effort to secure wider community
support for its preferred course of action in the decade after the Geneva
settlement of 1954.74
Furthermore, recourse to self-defense was not prompted by any
sudden necessity. It was decided upon in February, 1965, with con-
siderable deliberateness after consideration over a period of months,
if not years.75 In this circumstance, the burden of justification seems to
fall heavily on the United States for the following reasons:
(1) the essential ambiguity of the alleged aggression, especially in
view of the refusal of the Saigon regime to implement the election
provisions and its suppression of all political opposition;
(2) the non-recourse to the organs of the United Nations, despite the
time available and the refusal to adopt the war-terminating suggestions
of the Secretary General;
76
(3) the absence of a clear showing of necessity and justification re-
quired in contemporary international law to validate the exercise of
the right of self-defense;
74. CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL 71-76.
75. See the original official explanations for bombing North Viet Nam in BACKOI.OUND
INFORATION 148-52, and the more recent explanation in 56 DE"T STATE BULL. supra
note 72.
76. Compare Falk, supra note 1, at 1140.43, with text of Goldberg's Letter to the
Secretary General on December 19, 1966, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1966, at 6, col. 4, and
excerpts from U Thant's introduction to the annual report on the work of the United
Nations, Sept. 19, 1966, at 18, col. 5.
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(4) the consistent previous international practice of confining civil
strife, even in cases where the insurgent faction was aided and abetted
by outside powers, to territorial limits;
(5) the locus of conflict being outside the immediate security sphere
of the United States, thereby distinguishing the protective role exhib-
ited by United States diplomacy in Latin America71
These factors in the Viet Nam context are mentioned to indicate
the legal background. Such a background seems to require, at mini-
mum, a clear demonstration that the facts are as the United States
contends. The so-called "white papers" issued by the State Depart-
ment 8 are considered to be too one-sided even for Professor Moore.
Instead he relies heavily upon Douglas Pike, author of a detailed study
entitled Viet Cong, written at the M.I.T. Center for International
Studies, during a one-year leave of absence from his role as an official
of the United States Information Agency; 0 Mr. Pike had spent the
preceding six years serving in Viet Nam, during which period the re-
search was done. One need not be an editor of Ramparts to note that
M.I.T.'s Center has long been subsidized by the C.I.A. and has given
consistent guidance and support for United States foreign policy,
especially with regard to the containment of communism; a list of
Center publications indicates a consistent pro-Administration outlook.
Mr. Pike's analysis certainly deserves careful reading, and is to some
degree endorsed by Bernard Fall's interpretations, but the prospects of
bias must be noted and his conclusions must be carefully tested against
those reached by neutral observers.80 In responding to Professor Moore,
77. There are broad deferences accorded to principal sovereign states to prevent
hostile political changes in countries located within a traditional sphere of influence;
these interferences, although vigorously controversial, do not generally endanger inter-
national peace and security because a principal state is reluctant to use force in a rival
sphere of influence. Such geo-political toleration is not intended to serve as a juridical
vindication for unilateral interventionary practices that have been solemnly renounced.
For a legal critique of intervention carried on within a sphere of influence see Falk,
American Intervention in Cuba and the Rule of Law, 22 Oto ST. L.J. 546 (1951); this
analysis applies a fortiori to the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic.
78. U.S. D.P'r OF STATE, A THREAT To THE PEAcE: NOR= VIEr-NAM's FsronrT TO
CoNqua SoUTH Vmr-NAm (1961); U.S. D.P'T or STATE, AccRassiou mon Tm Norml:
TirE Rucoan oF NORTH ViET-NaAA's CAMPAIGN TO CoNQuER SoUrH Vmr-Navmr (1965),
(reprinted in 52 DE,'T STATE BULL. 404).
79. D. PmE, VmrcoNG: THE ORGANizATION AND Tm.mi'IQus or Tm NATIONAL LIMERATIoN
FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM (1966) [hereinafter cited as Pisp]; see also the apparent decep-
tion in an earlier attempt to show that Hanoi dominated the N.L.F., wherein the authors
C.I.A. affiliation was disguised by presenting him as "a student of political theory and Asian
affairs. . . former officer in U.S. AID Mission in Saigon; author of 'Aesthetics and the
Problem of Meaning.'" Carver, Jr., The Faceless Vietcong, 44 FoRmN ArrAmus 847 (196).
80. Among other unintended conclusions that emerge from Pike's study is the dear
sense that the National Liberation Front possesses the organizational efficiency, cohesion,
and talent to govern South Viet Nam in a manner never achieved by the Saigon regime.
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I would argue that by relying as heavily on Mr. Pike (without taking
serious account of the significantly different interpretations of Jean
Lacouture, George Kahin and John Lewis, and Bernard Fall) he bases
his conclusions of fact on ex parte presentations which, due to an ap-
pearance of academic impartiality, are more misleading than "the
White Papers" he dismissed as "one-sided." 81
Space permits me only to give two illustrations of why, aside from
his vested vocational outlook, I find it difficult to regard Mr. Pike as a
trust3vorthy guide to the facts in Viet Nam. The Preface ends with this
rather emotional statement of Pike's personal commitment to the
United States role in Viet Nam:
The plight of the Vietnamese people is not an abstraction to me,
and I have no patience with those who treat it as such. Victory by
the Communists would mean consigning thousands of Vietnamese,
many of them of course my friends, to death, prison, or permanent
exile.... My heart goes out to the Vietnamese people-who have
been sold out again and again, whose long history could be
written in terms of betrayal and who, based on this long and bitter
experience, can only expect that eventually America too will sell
them out. If America betrays the Vietnamese people by abandon-
ing them, she betrays her own heritage.82
What is striking about this passage is its identification of "the Viet-
namese people" with the American support of the Saigon regime. Does
not Mr. Pike think that if Marshal Ky prevails "thousands of Viet-
namese" would be consigned "to death, prison, or permanent exile"?8
This is what happened to the anti-Diem opposition in the South after
1954 (and, incidentally, to the anti-Ho opposition in the North), and
it is a common, if tragic, sequel to a bitter civil war. To associate the
prospect of such oppression exclusively with an N.L.F. victory, as
Pike does, is to endorse the most naive and sentimental American
From the perspective of international order the capacity to govern is certainly an element
in claiming political legitimacy. A second unintended conclusion is the extent to which
Hanoi's increasing influence upon the N.L.F. has been a direct consequence of the
American entry into combat operations. This increase in influence has, according to
Mr. Pike, temporarily at least submerged real differences in outlook and objectives be-
tween the N.L.F. and Hanoi, differences that belie the more general hypothesis that the
N.L.F. is a creation and creature of Hanoi's conjuring.
81. See, e.g., Max F. Millikan's Foreword in which he stesses the academic and disin-
terested character of the Center for International Studies and its sponsorship of Mr.
Pike's inquiry. PiIK, v-vi.
8R. Id. at xi-xii.
83. Cf. R. W. Apple, Jr., N.Y. Times, May 17, 1967, at 3, col. 2, describing the
activities of Miss Cao Ngoc Phuong in organizing a non-Communist, Buddhist opposition
to the Saigon regime's war policy and the harassment to which she has been subjected
by Premier Ky's police officials while trying to carry on her activities.
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propaganda. Also Pike's passage indicates the emotional character of
his commitment to "the American mission," a commitment that is
unqualified by any reference to the doubtful claims to rulership
possessed by the present Saigon leadership.S
4
When Pike explains the creation of the N.L.F. his bias appears in
the form of the following undocumented conjecture:
The creation of the N.L.F. was an accomplishment of such skill,
precision, and refinement that when one thinks of who the master
planner must be, only one name comes to mind: Vietnam's organi-
zational genius, Ho Chi Minh.s
Even Pike suggests that prior to the emergence of the N.L.F. in 1960
there had been sustained resistance to the Diem government by "Com-
munists, the religious sects, and other groups."6 0 The point is that even
a biased accounting of the facts is compelled to take account of the
pre-Communist and non-Communist role in the early years of the
insurgency.87
84. Consider, for instance, the inconsistency between the claims of a democratic
society in South Viet Nam and the Constitution approved by the Constituent As.mbly
in 1967. See, e.g., Article 5: "1. The Republic of Viet-Nam opposes communism in every
form. 2. Every activity designed to propagandize or carry out communism is prohibited";
Article 81(2): "The Supreme Court is empowered to decide on the dissolution of a
political party whose policy and activities oppose the republican regime." For the text
of the Constitution, see the Congressional Record (daily ed.) for June 6, 1967, S 773-37.
For a full account of the terror that commenced in 1954, see 2 Bu'rsGstn 893.916.
85. PiKE 76.
86. Id. 75. This non-Communist resistance to Saigon has also been emphasized by
Bernard Fairs accounts of the early phases of the insurgency. And as recently as May 1967,
Miss Cao Ngoc Phuong, who according to PL W. Apple, Jr., of the New York Times, "is
regarded as a heroine by peace-oriented intellectuals in South Vietnam," is quoted
as saying:
Many of my friends seem to have joined the Vietcong. We are losing the dite of our
country. These people know the National Liberation Front is closely allied, with the
Communists and we don't like Communism. But they see no future in this [the Ky]
Government.
N.Y. Times, May 17, 1967, at 3, col. 2.
87. 2 BuTrINGER 972-92 contains a very balanced account (but one written from an
anti-Communist perspective) of the origins of the Second Indochina War during the Diem
regime. Buttinger writes that "The Diem Government itself created the conditions that
pushed the population to the brink of open rebellion, and this convinced the Communist
leadership that the South could be conquered by force," id. 977. Buttinger believes
the "concerted effort to overthrow the Diem regime and its successor by force, was orga-
nized by the Communists, and while it would have made little headmay without wide
popular support, neither would it have had its amazing success without guidance and
assistance from the North.
"But the Saigon-Washington version of these events, which had been reduced to the
flat assertion that 'the Vietnam war is the result of external aggression' stra)s even farther
from historical truth. Neither the strenuous efforts of Saigon nor those of Washington
have produced evidence that anti-Diem terror and guerrilla warfare started as a result
of infiltration of combatants and weapons from the North. No significant infiltration
occurred before 1960, and very little during the next three years." Id. at 981-82. Even
according the North as substantial a role as Buttinger does, great doubt is still east on
the American inference of "external aggression," without which Professor Moore's entire
legal edifice is without proper foundation.
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But if one turns to disinterested observers the situation looks sig-
nificantly less supportive of the official American factual account. Jean
Lacouture88 wrote in May, 1966:
In the beginning most people in the National Liberation Front
(N.L.F.) were not Communist, although more are becoming
Communist day by day .... Until 1963, at least, the Communists
were a minority in the N.L.F., and if they found it necessary one
year before to create the People's Revolutionary Party (P.R.P.)
within the heart of the N.L.F., it was precisely to bolster their
inadequate influence.80
Lacouture also shows that the evidence of Hanoi's influence on the
N.L.F. is very tenuous as a consequence of differences in the style and
contents of its texts relevant to the war.00
It would appear, then, that impartial interpretations of the role of
Hanoi in aiding the N.L.F. do not significantly support Professor
Moore's factual inferences. 1 At best, the factual situation in Viet Nam
is ambiguous with respect to the relations between North Viet Nam
and the N.L.F. 92 Each side resolves the ambiguity to suit the image of
the war that it seeks to rely upon. I am convinced that the facts, al-
though ambiguous in some particulars, do not support equally con-
vincing interpretations by the supporters of Saigon and by the support-
ers of Hanoi; I am convinced that the weight of the evidence and the
burden of impartial commentary lends far closer support to Hanoi's
version of "the facts" than it does to Saigon's version. But, for sake of
analysis, let's assume that the ambiguity supports equally convincing,
if mutually inconsistent, accounts of the role of Hanoi in the crea-
tion, control, and outlook of the N.L.F. Even so, neither legal prece-
dent, nor legal commentary, nor sound policy analysis, supports the
88. Jean Lacouture is a distinguished correspondent for Le Monde who has written
extensively on Viet Nam for more than a decade, and holds a strongly anti-Communist
position.
89. Lacouture, The "Face" of the Viet Cong, WAR/PEAcE REPORT, May 1966, 7 (written
as a reply to Mr. Carver's article in FOMREGN ArTAiRs, supra note 79); Cf. IIIuN AND LEWS
109-16, especially at 109: "When the deadline for the promised election passed in July
1956, Hanoi Radio continued to counsel moderation and peaceful tactics to its Southern-
based supporters.
"For the next two years revolts against Diem emanated primarily from non-Vietminh
quarters."
90. Lacouture, The "Face" of the Viet Cong, WAR/PEAcE RFPoRT, May 1966, at 8.
91. KAHIN & LEWIs 110-16.
92. It is not only the facts as such, but their interpretation that is subject to disagree.
ment. The interpretation of the Vietcong's character depends on the orientation of tile
interpreter toward such related matters in the Viet Nam setting as Afro-Asian nationalism,
the Saigon regime, the effects of American involvement, and the kind of society that
would evolve from the various alternative lines of development open to South Viet Nam
(including reunification with the North).
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United States' contention, as of February, 1965, that North Viet Nam
had committed "an armed attack." Such a claim to strike back virtually
eliminates all legal restraint upon the discretion of a state or its allies
to transform an internal war into an international war. As such, it
repudiates the entire effort of twentieth century international law to
fetter discretionary recourse to force by a sovereign state. In addition,
in a situation of ambiguity the burden of asserting the right to use
military power against the territory of a foreign country should be
placed upon the claimant state. This burden is especially difficult to
sustain when the claim to use force is generalized rather than being
justified as a proportionate response to some specific provocation or
being directed at some specific external target relevant to the internal
war, such as a sanctuary or infiltration route. The United States has
increasingly claimed for itself the right to bomb whatever it deems ap-
propriate without restraint as to time, target, or magnitude.
Oppression by Saigon as a Causative Agent
Professor Moore's contextual account is strangely devoid of any
reference to the effects of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem's reign of terror in
the 1956-57 period in South Viet Nam. Bernard Fall, among others,
points out that the uprising of peasants against Saigon arose as a conse-
quence of Diem's policies that pre-existed the formation of the Vietcong
and was accomplished without any interference on the part of Hanoi.0
3
It is difficult to establish causal connections in the Viet Nam setting,
but any account of how the violence started in South Viet Nam should
call attention to the priority in time, as well as to the oppressiveness
and social backwardness of the Diem regime.
It seems worth considering the account given by Joseph Buttinger,
an ardent anti-Communist and the most knowledgeable narrator of
the relevant historical period (World War II to the assassination of
Diem in 1963).94 Buttinger calls "[the manhunt against the Vietminh
[the coalition of Vietnamese forces that had fought against French
colonialism] an almost incomprehensible violation of common sense,
and one of the major contributions to the success of the later Com-
munist-led insurrection."9 5 In addition to spreading terror throughout
South Viet Nam there were "an unending series of sermons about the
93. B. FAML, THE Two Vxr-NAms (Ist ed. 1963) 272: "the countryside largely went
Communist in 1958-60," i.e., before the Vietcong came into existence. [Quoted in 2
BuTTNGER 977.]
94. 2 BuriNGER 974-81.
95. Id. 975.
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evils of Communism, delivered in compulsory meetings by officials
whom the peasants had every reason to despise."90 The victims of
Diem's oppression included many non-Communists; "[e]fficiency took
the form of brutality and a total disregard for the difference between
determined foes and potential friends."91 Death, preceded by torture,
was the form of governmental action in this pre-Vietcong period in
the South when there was only an apprehension about a Communist-
led insurrection, but no action. Buttinger gives an explanation of why
Diem's reign of terror did not provoke official American protest
that exposes the root of the Viet Nam tragedy: "The American public,
which a little later was told of the many Diem officials murdered by
the so-called Vietcong, learned nothing at all about these earlier events,
not so much because of Saigon's censorship but rather because of the
West's reluctance openly to condemn crimes committed in the name of
anti-Communism."9 8 It is this ideological biasing of perception that
has led the United States Government and its supporters to believe in
the rationalization of the war in Viet Nam as defense against aggression.
To give Diem and his successors the kind of backing that we have
given him can only be explained as part of a global crusade against
the spread of Communist influence.9
The Relevance of United States Aid to the Incumbent Regime
The inference of "armed attack" must include an examination of
the overall relevant context. But Professor Moore ignores altogether
the relevance of the United States connection with the Saigon regime
to an appraisal of Hanoi's role. The assistance to the N.L.F. given by
Hanoi takes on a very different character if interpreted as neutralizing
the assistance given by the United States to the other side in an ongoing
civil struggle. 00 International law does not prohibit discrimination
96. Id.
97. Id. 976.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. This understanding of the American commitment must have prompted U Thant
in the Introduction to the Annual Report on the work of the United Nations in 1966 to
say: "I see nothing but danger in this idea, so assiduously fostered outside Vietnam, that
the conflict is a kind of holy war between two powerful political ideologies." N.Y. Times,
Sept. 19, 1966, at 18, col. 5. Stillman and Pfaff write in a similar vein in the course of a
major analysis of U.S. foreign policy: "Our dominating impulse in Vietnam is ideological;
the conventional political and strategic justifications for the American involvement in
Vietnam seem peripheral, and even doubtful." E. SnLuirN & W. PiAr, PowER AND
IMPOTENCE 171 (1966).
100. Consider the relevance of these words of John Stuart Mill:
But the case of a people struggling against a foreign yoke, or against a native tyranny
upheld by foreign arms, illustrates the reasons for non-intervention in an opposite
way; for in this case the reasons themselves do not exist.... To assist a people thus
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in favor of an insurgent, especially one that has already enjoyed a
degree of success, who is deemed to be "just" nor does it prohibit
counter-interventionary efforts designed to offset intervention on be-
half of the incumbent.101 The policies of self-determination at stake
are best served by an attitude of impartiality. The coercive apparatus
of the modern state is able to suppress even very widely based popular
uprisings; the evolution of social control increasingly favors the govern-
ment in a domestic struggle. The advantages of the domestic govern-
ment are accentuated by its normal intercourse with foreign states,
including its option to continue to receive foreign aid. If peaceful
domestic opposition is disallowed and a coercive government is aided
by a powerful external ally, then the sole possibility of approximating
the ideas of self-determination is to accord equivalent rights to in-
surgent or anti-incumbent groups that solicit aid from foreign
countries.
If the insurgency succeeds in establishing itself as the de facto gov-
ernment of a substantial portion of the territory in controversy, then
foreign states are legally as entitled to deal with the insurgent faction
as with the constituted government. Such discretion, expressed in
traditional international law by the shifting of insurgent status from
"rebellion" to "insurgency" to "belligerency," embodies a sound com-
promise between according respect to the constituted government as the
source of domestic stability and avoiding interferences with the way
in which contending groups in a national society work out a domestic
balance of forces. This reasoning is applicable to the situation in South
Viet Nam. As of 1961, at the latest, the National Liberation Front was
in effective control of a substantial portion of South Viet Nam and
often was exercising its authority in areas under its control with more
success than was the constituted regime in Saigon. 1 2 At such a stage in
kept down, is not to disturb the balance of forces on which the permanent mainte-
nance of freedom in a country depends, but to redress that balance when it is already
unfairly and violently disturbed. . . Intervention to enforce non-intervention is
always rightful, always moral, if not aiv)as prudent (emphasis added).
J. S. M ILL, EssAYS ON POLrTIcs AND CULTURE 412 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 196-).
101. See notes 62-64 supra and pp. 1120-23.
102. Cf., e.g., IV. BuaCnErr, Vmrtvia: INSME STORY OF THE GUEmULLA WAn (1965). No
friend of the N.L.F., Bernard Fall nevertheless writes that "on the local level, American
sources have privately stated matter-of-factly that the local NLF administration dcearly
outperformed the GVN's on every count until the heavy bombardments of 1965.66 made
orderly government impossible. It was an established fact that in most areas the NLF
did proceed with local elections that were by and large unfettered-Communist control
would exist in the form of a can-bo (a cadre) detached to the village chief for his paper-
work-and produced more effective and more popularly supported local government than
the country had enjoyed since its loss of independence in the 1860's." B. FAL,, Tim Tw;o
VirT-NA is 365 (2d rev. ed. 1967).
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civil strife international law fully allows third-parties to treat the
society in question as exhibiting a condition of dual sovereignty. In
these circumstances North Viet Nam's assistance to the N.L.F. enjoys
the same legal status as does the United States' assistance to the Saigon
regime. 103 Such an interpretation bears centrally on any contention
that North Viet Nam committed an armed attack on South Viet Nam
subsequent to whatever critical date is chosen to affirm substantial de
facto sovereignty by the N.L.F. 04 The argument of the State Depart-
ment, then, that the level of support given to the N.L.F. up through
1965 establishes "aggression" of such magnitude as to be "an armed
attack" is unresponsive to the basic legal issues at stake. Even accepting
as accurate the conclusion that "by the end of 1964, North Viet Nam
might well have moved over 40,000 armed and unarmed guerrillas into
South Viet Nam" there is no consideration given to the critical fact that
as of 1962 the N.L.F. enjoyed enough de facto sovereignty in South Viet
Nam to allow North Viet Nam to furnish military assistance on the
same legal premises as relied upon by the United States vis-,-vis
Saigon. 0 5 The whole legal tradition of third-party relationships to
contending factions in a civil war is to distinguish the degrees to which
a revolutionary struggle has succeeded in establishing itself as a partial
"government." Neither the State Department nor Professor Moore
take this essential contextual factor into account to any extent in
characterizing North Viet Nam's role as "an armed attack."
Given a post-1962 assumption of de facto dual sovereignty in South
Viet Nam, third powers are entitled to neutralize and offset external
103. See generally A. THoMAS & A. THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS
IMPORT IN THE AmIwcAS 215-21 (1956); Falk, The International Regulation of Internal
Violence in the Developing Countries, 1966 Paoc. Am. Soc. INT'L L. at 58; for the reality
and extent of N.L.F. control as of mid-1965 see B. FALL, TIIE Two VIET NAmas 381, 388
(2d rev. ed. 1967).
104. See especially the basis of argument in the State Department's Memorandum of
Law in its opening section vindicating recourse to collective self-defense because of a
prior armed attack. CONSULTAME COUNCIL 113-14. There is obviously no "armed attack"
if the foreign assistance is being given lawfully to one governmental unit in a situation
of civil strife in which the adversary unit is receiving a much larger quantity of foreign
assistance.
105. That is, the notion of neutrality was supposed to guide third-powers in the event
of an ongoing civil war. See, e.g., A. THoMrAs & A. THONAS, supra note 103, at 219:
A neutral power is always at liberty to decide whether it will permit or will prohibit
aid to the disrupted state; its main duty as a neutral is that it must treat both sides
equally.
An obvious corollary of this norm is that when a neutral favors one side, then this advan.
tage can be offset by discrimination in favor of the other side. Depending on the phasing
of intervention with the existence of a conflict pronounced enough to qualify as a civil
war, both the United States and North Viet Nam could reasonably perceive their roles
to be one of offsetting or neutralizing the intervention or non-neutrality of the other side,
Cf. White, supra note 3.
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assistance to the other side. Certainly, then, North Viet Nam's military
assistance to the N.L.F. seems proportionate to the United States'
military assistance to the Saigon regime. Even more certainly, it is un-
reasonable to characterize North Viet Nam's role after 1962 as "an
armed attack" and the United States' role as "lawful assistance." It is
also relevant to note that no American official contended that the pre-
1962 role of North Viet Nam deserved to be regarded as "an armed
attack"; even during the debates on the American claims of "reprisal"
arising out of the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August, 1964, there was
no intimation that North Viet Nam's role in South Viet Nam was of the
extraordinary character justifying recourse to "self-defense." It seems
clear and significant to conclude that the post-1965 contention of
"armed attack" besides being unconvincing on their merits is also an
example of arguing post hoc, ergo propter hoc.
In the months immediately after the Geneva Conference in 1954
it was widely believed that the Diem regime would collapse from its
own dead weight because of its unpopularity and inefficiency. The
United States gave substantial economic and indirect military support
to the Saigon government from the beginning of its existence. This
support included training, guiding, and paying the main units of
Saigon's military establishment.1 0 The United States also played an
increasingly significant role in influencing the composition and outlook
of Saigon's government, so significant that by the time serious civil
strife broke out there was hardly any prospect of resolution being
reached by the domestic balance of forces.
As the American military participation on the side of Saigon grew
more overt and massive it became clearer that it was Washington and
not Saigon that was the main adversary of the N.L.F.10 T As Hanoi
acted to offset this American military presence in South Viet Nam it
was naturally drawn into ever more substantial and overt military
participation on the side of the N.L.F. 0 8 And certainly since 1963 the
United States' control of Saigon's war effort and war aims appears to
be much more explicit and decisive than does Hanoi's control over
the N.L.F.'s war effort and war aims. Given the ratio of external partici-
pation on the two sides of the Viet Nam war it seems contrary both to
106. KAmN & LEWiS 77-80; Tm ME?uNFiE RREPOR 20.
107. Increasingly, it became clear that the United States, and not South Viet Nam, was
determining the course of the war and the conditions for its settlement.
108. But can one imagine a conference of the N.L.F. allies summoned under the
auspices of North Viet Nam in the manner of the 1965-66 conferences at Honolulu, Manila,
and Guam? For comparative statistics on foreign involvement in the mar in Viet Nam
see KAMN & LEwIS 185; B. FA. , Tm Two Vm'r-NAS.%s 358 (2d rev. ed. 1967).
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the perceptions of common sense and to the dictates of international
law to regard North Viet Nam as guilty of an armed attack. The total
context suggests that the phasing and extent of the United States partic-
ipation in the war has had a much greater impact upon its course than
has the North Vietnamese participation, and that neither side enjoys a
privileged legal status so far as the principles of either self-defense or
non-intervention are concerned, at least once it became clear that the
insurgent challenge was a serious and prolonged one. In fact, the legal
status of Hanoi's role in assisting the insurgency is according to con-
ventional approaches of international law dependent upon the extent
to which it is reasonable to regard the insurgent faction as a counter-
government in effective political control over portions of the contested
territory.10 9 If Professor Moore stresses the de facto sovereignty of
South Viet Nam (regardless of the terms at Geneva), then it seems
essential to acknowledge all relevant de facto circumstances including
those that benefit the legal contentions of North Viet Nam. In the first
Mansfield Report it was acknowledged that "[b]y 1961 it was apparent
that the prospects for a total collapse in South Viet Nam had begun
to come dangerously close."""
In the context of Viet Nam, however, the normal legal situation is
even less favorable to the incumbent regime than it might otherwise
be. Chapter III of the Cease-Fire Agreement contains a series of provi-
sions that disallows the incumbent regime its normal freedom to receive
military assistance."' Article 4 of the Final Declaration "takes note
of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet
Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet Nam of foreign troops and
military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions." 112
Therefore, it is arguable that without the authorization of the Inter-
national Control Commission it was illegal to give any direct military
assistance to the Saigon regime; it is also arguable that the United
States immediately fostered the violation of the spirit of the Accords
by the extension of SEATO to cover South Viet Nam and by the
extension of economic aid of such a character that freed Saigon to
develop and modernize its military capability as directed by a growing
number of United States military advisers. It is difficult to read the
Geneva Accords without receiving the strong impression that one of the
109. Cf. note 102 supra and 1185.
110. THE MANSFIELD RPOORT 21.
111. Articles 16-18; convenient text of Final Declaration, CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL 148.50,
FURTHER DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DISCUSSION OF INDOCHINA AT THE GENEVA CON-
FE ENCE (Misc. No. 20) C~m. No. 9289 (1954).
112. Convenient text of Final Declaration, CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL 148.
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principal purposes was to prohibit post-1954 Great Power intervention
in Vietnamese affairs, and given the United States' attempt to mobilize
support for a Great Power intervention as an alternative to the Geneva
Settlement it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the provisions on
foreign military intervention were directed, above all, at the United
States.
Professor Moore suggests that the belligerent objective of North
Viet Nam is reunification under Hanoi's control, and he contends that
this objective is the functional equivalent of territorial conquest. Such
reasoning leads Moore to conclude that Hanoi's assistance to the N.L.F.
is more suitably treated as equivalent to North Korea's attack on South
Korea than it is to Germany's aid to the Franco insurgency during the
Spanish Civil War. I find Professor Moore's conclusion on this point,
also, to rest upon a selective interpretation of the relevant context for
the following reasons:
(1) Hanoi's pursuit of unification by limited, low-order coercion
needs to be understood in light of the outcome of the first Indochina
War and the terms of the Geneva Settlement; from the perspective
of law North Viet Nam must be accorded a reciprocal discretion in
interpreting post-1954 events as is claimed for South Viet Nam;
(2) The evidence advanced by Professor Moore to show that North
Viet Nam is seeking reunification is largely hypothetical and specu-
lative;
(3) Both Hanoi and the N.L.F. disavow reunification as an objective
of their war effort.
113
On this basis it seems unconvincing to equate North Korea's sudden
and massive overt attack upon South Korea with North Viet Nam's
slow build-up of support for the N.L.F. through covert assistance to an
insurgent effort against a hostile neighboring regime allied with a
hostile superpower. The United States' ill-fated support for the Bay
of Pigs venture in 1961 was not so long ago. 14 We went to considerable
lengths to disguise our sponsorship of the Cuban exiles intent on over-
throwing Castro. Why? Precisely because different world order conse-
quences attach to covert rather than to overt sponsorship of insurrec-
tionary activity in a foreign country. 15 And what of the role of the C.I.A.
113. Both sides evidently avow peaceful reunification. South Viet Nam goes so far as
to incorporate the following two provisions into its new Constitution: Article 1(1): "Viet-
Nam is a territorially, indivisible, unified and independent republic." Article 107: "Article
1 of the constitution and this Article may not be amended or deleted." May not North
Viet Nam espouse a comparable objective? See generally Draper, Vietnam: How Not to
Negotiate, N.Y. Rrvamw or Boors, May 4, 1967, at 17.
114. See Falk; supra note 77.
115. See Falk, supra note 1, at 1126, n.18.
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in the overthrow of an allegedly pro-Communist regime in Guatemala
in 1954?116 I mention these examples of covert interference not to
defend this pattern of practice, but to suggest that when the United
States has been an active party in support of insurrection a great effort
has been made to keep its role as covert as possible for as long as
possible. Likewise it was the overtness of our interference with domestic
events in the Dominican Republic in 1965 that provoked such intense
criticism of our action; it was probably less interventionary than the
covert role in Guatemala.117 Thus it is not accurate to analogize the
covert pursuit of an interventionary policy in a foreign society with
its overt pursuit in terms either of its perceived or actual world order
consequences, even assuming for the sake of argument that the two
modes of interference are equally effective. And therefore, and this is
critical for my approach, a unilateral defensive extra-territorial re-
sponse to covert coercion cannot possibly acquire the same legitimacy
as would such a response if made to overt coercion. For these reasons
I find it inappropriate to rely upon the Korea analogy; the Spanish
Civil War I continue to regard as a helpful precedent because there
was no counter-intervention undertaken against the territory of inter-
vening states despite substantial foreign assistance to the insurgent
faction.
Type 1I Geographical Restrictions upon "Defensive" Measures Pro-
motes World Order. The Normative Level of Discourse
Professor Moore argues that the restrictions imposed upon the in-
cumbent regime in a Type II situation are arbitrary and that in a par-
ticular situation defensive measures against the territory of a state sup-
porting an insurgent ought to be permitted. I would agree with
Professor Moore that in a particular war it can be argued that extra-
territorial military measures may minimize the extent and duration
of destruction. Relevant rules of restraint, however, must be devised
with a generality of instances in mind. In the context of a Viet Nam-
type war I would maintain that Type II restrictions are, in general,
desirable. First of all, the appreciation of whether a measure is "de-
fensive" or "offensive" cannot be reliably achieved by interested
parties. Second, to the extent that extra-territorial "defensive" measures
are justified by the specific characteristics of foreign support, then a
116. D. WISE AND T. Ross, THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT (1964). For a relevant account
of Guatemala events, see D. HOROWITZ, FROM YALTA TO VIETNAM 160.61 (1965).
117. For an account critical of the United States intervention in the Dominican Re-
public, see J. FULBPGHT, THE AAROGANcE OF PowER (1966).
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precise claim to use extra-territorial force should be explained in terms
of particular military necessities. For example, an air strike directed
against extra-territorial insurgent sanctuaries would be more easily
justifiable in the context of normal Type II restraints if these sanctu-
aries bore a significant specific relationship to the conduct of the war.
But bombing North Viet Nam has not been justified in terms of
specific, limited military objectives requiring exceptional action; in
fact, the American rationale for bombing North Viet Nam has changed
character from time to time and the scope and intensity of the bombing
action appear disproportionate to the military justification. In addi-
tion, independent, non-Communist world public opinion almost uni-
versally condemns the continuation of bombing by the United States
and the Secretary General of the United Nations has repeatedly called
upon the United States to stop bombing on a unilateral and uncondi-
tional basis. Hanoi, too, has insisted that the unconditional termination
of bombing is the essential precondition for peace talks. The United
States' effort to negotiate a reciprocal de-escalation by North Viet Nam
in exchange for a halt in bombing overlooks both the general attitude
in opposition of the bombing and the inequality in bargaining power
that exists between the greatest military colossus in world history and
a tiny war-torn and unmodernized state.
Third, the frequency of patterns of intervention and counter-inter-
vention in civil strife throughout international society underlines the
danger of spreading violence beyond its original national locus. Greece
and Turkey in Cyprus and the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia
in the Yemen are two examples of civil struggles that could grow
much worse if the external sponsor of the incumbent regime felt
entitled and did, in fact, attack the territory of the insurgent's external
sponsor.118 It does not require much knowledge of fire-fighting to con-
clude that confining the spatial scope of a fire is one way to restrict its
damaging impact.
If the coercion is sustained and substantial then the prospects of
dealing with it by community procedures are improved. Because of the
ambiguity of the facts and the tendency to interpret them in a self-
justifying fashion in the Viet Nam setting it is important to restrict
118. In fact, one would imagine a serious regional war emerging if either side trans-
gressed the limits that I argue are embodied in a Type II conflict. Only the mutual
forbearance of both sides, despite their recriminations about each other's aggression, keeps
the conflict at its present level. It is only because the United States is a superpower and
North Viet Nam a minor state that the war in Viet Nam has not escalated to much higher
levels; it is the power differential that encouraged the United States to transgress Type H
restrictions in the spirit of relative prudence.
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responses to the limits of Type II unless a sufficient consensus can be
mobilized to shift the conflict into the Type IV category. If it qualifies
as a Type IV conflict then the organized international community
authorizes the response that is deemed appropriate. Community author-
ization takes the place of overtness as the key factor vindicating a
defensive response against foreign territory. I have already indicated
why covert forms of coercion are so difficult to construe, especially in
a mixed-up political setting. It follows from this assessment that the
resources of world order should be built up to facilitate the authorita-
tive community identification of covert coercion as "aggression." For
this reason it would be desirable to establish border-control, fact-
finding machinery, and peace observation groups in those sectors of
the world containing target societies that are highly vulnerable to
covert coercion. The objective of these devices is to make covert forms
of coercion more visible to impartial observers, facilitating a consensus,
legitimating a decisive defensive response, and discouraging recourse
to such coercion as a means to resolve international disputes.
My overall approach to Viet Nam-type conflicts has been altered
in response to Professor Moore's criticisms in several important re-
spects:
(1) The creation of Type IV to establish an analytic contrast with
Types I-III and to permit "self-defense" in the Viet Nam-type setting
provided a suitable prior community authorization has been given.110
(2) The realization that aggressive designs can be effectively carried
out at present by covert forms of international coercion and that it
would be desirable to discourage such coercion by making it more
visible; the eventual world order goal would be to treat covert coercion
as we now treat overt coercion. The effect would be to make Type II
conflicts more easily transferable into the Type IV category or more
susceptible to Type I treatment. However, in international society
as now constituted it seems clearly preferable to deny the victim state
unilateral discretion to treat what it perceives to be "aggression" by
covert means as justifying its recourse to "self-defense." 120 In a sense
this legal conclusion merely restates the adverse judgment rendered
by the international community on several occasions when Israel has
119. A defensive alliance, such as SEATO, only multi-lateralizes decisions to use force
to a very slight degree; "the community" must be defined in wide enough terms to include
princpal divergent elements.
120. This denial is especially justifiable since (a) legitimate defensive interests can be
upheld within the terms of Type II, and special exceptions thereto; and (b) shift to
Type I tends both to increase the obstruction of international peace and to increase the
role of military power differentials in achieving a settlement of an international dispute.
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had recourse to overt military force in retaliation for damage that it
has suffered from semi-covert coercion. The rejection of Israel's claim is
impressive because Israel has a much more convincing security rationale
than does South Viet Nam for striking back overtly and because the Arab
states surrounding Israel are avowedly committed to its destruction?1'
One may argue against the fairness of such constraints upon Israel's
discretion in these circumstances, but it is essentially an extra-legal
appeal as the organs of the United Nations have the procedural
capacity to authorize or prohibit specific uses of force, and it is the
exercise of this capacity that most clearly distinguishes what is "legal"
from what is "illegal" with regard to the use of force in international
society. Legality depends more upon the identity of the authorizing
decision-maker than upon the facts of the coercion. With respect to
Viet Nam, if a principal organ of the United Nations authorized the
United States' bombing of North Viet Nam, then it would be legal
(unless an argument could be successfully made that the decision was
"unconstitutional").1 2
Professor Moore also usefully singles out "divided" country problems
for separate treatments. He is correct in pointing out that world order
is especially endangered by attempts to alter coercively the status quo
prevailing in a divided country. In this respect the tragic consequences
in Viet Nam can be understood as foredestined as soon as Saigon, with
the backing of the United States, acted to locate Viet Nam in the
divided country category.'- The uncertainty as to whether Viet Nam
is properly classified as "divided" in Professor Moore's sense involves
an interpretation of the Geneva Accords. The classification of Viet Nam
as a divided country also appears to have been imprudent in view of
the logistic difficulties of securing South Viet Nam against attack and
in view of the inability to evolve a tolerable regime in Saigon that
could provide South Viet Nam with effective government without a
huge American military and economic commitment.' 4 Even without
121. Israel's responses have seemed to conform much more closely to the requirements
of proportionality than has the United States-South Viet Nam response, even if its
allegations of coercion are taken at face value.
122. To be legal in the last analysis is to be authorized by the appropriate decision-
maker; one can seek to correct "the mistake" attributed to the decision-maker, but the
capacity to confer legality persists so long as the legal order is a vAid one.
123. The seeds of conflict seem to have been sown by the contradictor), interpretations
of what was "settled" at Geneva in 1954 with regard to the terms and timing of reunifica-
tion; although there is room for some misunderstanding, my orientation is heavily influ-
enced by regarding Hanoi's interpretation of the settlement as far more reasonable than
Saigon's or Washington's.
124. See the critique advanced by E. STir.L.', & 1%. PFAr, POWER ,R L'AorID NPMCE
169-74. The opportunity costs of the Viet Nam war are enormous both with respect to
the pursuit of international security goals and with regard to domestic welfare goals.
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a hostile North Viet Nam embittered by a sense of being cheated by
the non-implementation of the Geneva Accords, there is reason to
suspect that without American backing the Saigon regime would have
been unable to govern South Viet Nam with any success. Predictions
of imminent collapse were widespread until the American military
presence assumed major proportions in 1965.121 In addition, there was
only minimal and grudging alliance support, much less community
support, for regarding South Viet Nam as an inviolable sovereign
entity of the same sort as West Germany or South Korea, or even
Formosa. For these reasons I do not find it convincing, independent
of the issue of ambiguous facts, to analogize Viet Nam to other divided
country problems.
III. Comments on Professor Moore's Policy Inquiry vis-h-vis Type III
Conflict
Professor Moore's perceptive discussion of the considerations that
bear on the international management of intra-state conflict deserves
careful study. His stress in the setting of Type III upon the policies
of self-determination and minimum world public order points up the
difficulty that results from the sort of over-generalization that is im-
plicit in the kind of categorization of international conflict situations
that I have proposed. I accept his criticism that my original formula-
tion of Type III rules is "simplistic" if applied mechanically to a large
variety of greatly varying international contexts. A complete response
to Professor Moore's critique cannot be undertaken within the compass
of this article, but will be attempted on another occasion.12 I will re-
strict myself here to a few general comments on Professor Moore's ap-
proach to suggest wherein my policy emphasis differs from his with
regard to the regulation of third-party participation in intra-state
conflict.
Let me say in my own intellectual defense that the division of inter.
national conflict situations into three broad categories (now four)127
125. KAHIN & LEiIS 66-87.
126. For instance, Types I-IV should be appropriately sub-divided to take account of
recurrent contexts that can be grouped together within each broader category. Thus In
Type III there is a difference between the legislative contexts relevant to uprisings in the
five countries of southern Africa, the humanitarian context of slaughter that followed
after the generals' counter-coup in Indonesia (1965-66), the anarchy that has been threat.
ened from time to time in the Congo and Nigeria from prolonged civil strife, and the
hegemonial context that exists when one superpower has claimed over time special geo.
political prerogatives, acquiesced in by other states, in relation to a region.
127. See pp. 1106-08 for explanation.
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was intended primarily to facilitate and organize thought about the
management of all forms of international violence through a prelimi-
nary sorting out of relevant contexts and by explicating the decisive
legal consequences of each. Once this preliminary task of classifica-
tion has been accomplished, then it is appropriate to question whether
there need to be more specific subcategories and whether rules stating
exceptions should not also be included. -28 On this level, then, my re-
sponse to Professor Moore is to accept his criticism, but to suggest
that the attempt to categorize international conflict appears to add
greater focus to policy inquiry than is possible by either an ad hoc re-
sponse to a specific conflict (Viet Nam) or by a generalized description
of the policies bearing most heavily on the legal regulation of recourse
to international violence.
On a more fundamental level of policy Professor Moore, as the result
of a very sophisticated analysis, appears to conclude that given the con-
ditions of the modern world it is more desirable to endorse an approach
to civil strife that authorizes discrimination in favor of the incumbent
faction, especially in cold war settings, and prohibits assistance to the
insurgent faction.
I am persuaded by Professor Moore's analysis to modify my original
formulations to a certain extent. A neutral rule of impartiality does
not preclude the continuation of (or even the moderate increase in)
the level of assistance furnished a constituted government prior to the
outbreak of civil strife. There are, however, restraints upon the scope
and form of discriminatory external participationnO For one thing,
foreign assistance should not include direct participation in combat
operations. For another, it should not attempt to bear more than a
fairly small percentage, certainly under 50 per cent, of the increased
military requirements created by the domestic uprising. And finally,
the external assistance should not be conditioned upon increased in-
fluences in the process of decision-making within the recipient country.
In the event that the restraints sketched above are ignored, then the
conflict is shifted from Type III into the Type II category, the shift
itself reflecting "the violation" committed by a third-party state. If
the restraints are respected with respect to aid furnished to the incum-
bent, then substantial aid to instigate or sustain an insurgency is a vio-
128. Note the development of international law governing the use of the oceans as de-
picted by M. McDougal and W. Burke in The Public Order of the Oceans.
129. For a creative effort at emphasizing limits on the character of intervention rather
upon its occurrence see Farer, Intervention in Civil wars: A M1odest Proposal, 67 Coutwt.
L. Rav. 266 (1967).
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lation of Type III restraints that shifts the conflict into the Type II
category as a consequence of the illegal conduct of the third party.
In the event, however, that the uprising succeeds in establishing
control over a substantial portion of the area and population of the
country, then a condition of de facto dual sovereignty exists such that
third-parties can furnish assistance to the insurgent on the same basis
as to the incumbent. If substantial assistance is accorded to one or
both sides subsequent to de facto dual sovereignty the conflict is
necessarily shifted into Type II, but there is no violation of inter-
national law committed by third powers. The internal situation
generated a shift from Type III to Type II, as distinct from a shift
coming about through interventionary roles by foreign states on either
side of a Type III conflict.
If the United States had chosen to give military assistance to the
Batista regime in its struggle against the Castro insurgency in Cuba,
then this would be permissible unless the United States entered Cuba
in the last stages of the war with its independent military capability
so as to foreclose the outcome that would have resulted from the
domestic balance of forces. The Soviet intervention in Hungary (1956)
definitely succeeded in reversing the outcome of a domestic struggle,
and was appropriately condemned by the political organs of the United
Nations; the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic in
1965 designed to displace the incumbent regime was given presumably
an even more objectionable form of decisive external assistance as it
was directed against the incumbent faction.8 0
Professor Moore is also correct to suggest that in cold war contexts
rules supporting the stability of existing regimes are probably desir-
able. It may be helpful to restrict pure Type III analysis to the Afro-
Asian world wherein the geo-political context is of different order. In
effect, Professor Moore is pointing out that the rival superpowers-
the United States and the Soviet Union-provide their own form of
conflict management within those segments of international society
regarded as belonging to their respective spheres of influence or
adhering to their respective security communities. In this regard it may
be helpful to consider that concentric security zones surround each
superpower and affect the actual treatment of Type III conflicts to a
considerable degree:
I. Primary Security Zone: The United States, the Soviet Union, and
130. For a sympathetic account of the legal basis of the Dominican intervention, see
A. THowsxs & A. THOMAS, supra note 103.
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possibly mainland China and the principal states of Western Europe,
as sovereign states in relation to their own national security;
II. Secondary Security Zones: Groups of countries that are tradi-
tionally subject to the influence of one superpower or the other and
whose security interests are governed by the political preference of
the superpower; 31
III. Tertiary Security Zones: The Afro-Asian world of recently
independent states in which policies of non-alignment and non-inter-
vention are affirmed.
These security zones describe the geo-political condition in the
world as of 1967. It is a complex world order issue to interrelate these
political realities with the role of law in establishing common standards
of restraint and interaction. It is generally true that in the Secondary
Security Zones the dominant actor is able to exercise control over the
outcome of Type III conflicts, although Hungary in 1956 and the
Dominican Republic in 1965 were governed by interventions that did
not accord generally with permissible uses of military power, at least
as understood by general community expectations. 32
Viet Nam has become such a sustained and major war because the
United States has converted a Type III conflict into Type I conflict
without the legitimizing benefit of an overt armed attack and without
the geo-political tolerance accorded to superpower diplomacy that is
confined within its own Secondary Zone. Therefore, the extra-legal
categorization of security zones may help to identify those situations
in which external military assistance that is carried beyond a certain
threshold is likely to trigger a major off-setting military action by a
principal adversary. It is now commonplace to note that the most severe
forms of international violence since World War II have been the
result of competing superpower interferences in the Tertiary Security
Zone, especially in those circumstances, such as Viet Nam, where it is
unclear whether the territory in dispute belongs in the Secondary
Zone, and if so on which side, or in the Tertiary Zone.
Professor Moore's discussion is strangely devoid of any reference
to the role of international institutions or to the relevance of the will
of the organized international community with respect to the relative
131. E.g., Latin America, East Europe; one might argue that the problems in Asian
affairs arise out of China's attempt to establish a Secondary Security Zone on its periphery
and the United States resistance to this attempt.
132. I.e., there is a geo-political level of practice that exists in a state of tension with
a moral-legal level of commitment; both levels converge in the policy-maing process
relevant to international decisions.
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merits of contending factions in a Type III situation.113 It seems to
me that many of the problems that Professor Moore points out, that
arise in discriminating between various Type III contexts can be
resolved by according regional and global international institutions the
competence to identify which faction is entitled to benefit from ex-
ternal assistance. Thus in the context of Southern Africa the decisive
expression of the will of the international community would appear to
legitimize discrimination in favor of the insurgent faction in the event
that a Type III situation should arise at some future occasion;18 4 such
discrimination has been stridently endorsed in the African context by
the Organization of African Unity.18 5 Types I-III are residual categories
that exist only when there is no consensus formally reached by a
competent international institution.
A residual rule of impartiality does seem to minimize the role of both
extra-national and domestic violence in situations where no inter-
national consensus exists. The absence of consensus is itself indicative
of a potentiality for major conflict, disclosing seriously opposed inter-
pretations of the appropriate external attitude toward the intra-state
conflict. Therefore, in a Type III situation it would seem generally
desirable to promote adherence to Hall's view that neither incumbent
nor insurgent should be the beneficiary of discrimination.'3" What
level of support for the incumbent constitutes "discrimination" and
at what point a civil disturbance is properly regarded as belonging in
Type III are complex determinations of fact and law for which no
definite answer can here be provided.
Professor Moore, in my judgment, underrates once again the detri-
mental consequences of affirming the discretion of sovereign states to
project their military power into foreign political conflicts. It is true
that covert forms of coercion can subject a society to an "attack" that
jeopardizes its political independence and territorial sovereignty, but
it is also true that "the defense" of that society may involve its destruc-
tion and manipulation. To allow discrimination in favor of the in-
cumbent to increase without limit in a situation of civil strife is to
133. Cf. Falk, The New States and International Legal Order, 118 RECUEIL DES CotRS
- (forthcoming).
134. On jurisprudential basis see Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the
General Assembly, 60 Amt. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966).
135. For some consideration of the difficulties that attend regional authorization of the
use of force see Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War, in INnRh.
NATIONAL AsPEcts OF CIVIL STUFE 185, 242-46 (J. Rosenau ed. 1964).
136. On the assumption, of course, of some de facto control and some substantial
prospect of eventual success, and subject to the geo-political qualifications of the three-
zone analysis.
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defeat altogether the ideals of self-determination without promoting
the kind of world order premised upon the ordering capacities of
territorially based sovereign states. To insulate Type III conflicts it
is as important to restrict discrimination in favor of the incumbent as
it is to improve the process of detecting covert assistance to the in-
surgent by making it more visible. To do one without the other is to
invite Viet Nam-type confrontations throughout the Tertiary Security
Zone. I would espouse a foreign policy of Cosmopolitan Isolationism
as most suited to the attainment of world order in the Tertiary Security
Zone: national military power should be brought to bear, if at all, only
after formal authorization by the organized international commu-
nity.137 In my revised system of categorization, then, external assistance
beyond status quo levels is only permissible if the intra-state conflict
can be shifted from Type III to Type IV.
IV. The State Department Brief: A Further Comment
Professor Moore explains that the State Department Memorandum
of Law was written mainly to deal witi the public debate initiated
by a widely circulated (and now redrafted) brief of the Lawyers' Com-
mittee on American Policy Towards Viet Nam.138 As such, it should
not be appraised as the full statement of the Government's position.
This is undoubtedly true, but it is nevertheless disappointing that when
the Department's Legal Adviser enters the public debate, he does so in
such an unconvincing manner. Certainly, it does not clarify the dis-
cussion to over-clarify the facts or to make complex legal questions
appear self-evident. A citizens' white paper in opposition to Govern-
ment policy is primarily a call for an impartial accounting, it is inten-
tionally and appropriately one-sided; especially in the security area
it is impossible to proffer criticism in effective form unless the issues
are somewhat overstated.130 It is true, as Professor Moore writes, that
the Lawyers' Committee first Memorandum emphasized many of the
"wrong" issues or stated the "right" issues in the "wrong" way, but it
did provoke the Government after a decade of involvement in Viet
Nam to make its first serious effort to reconcile United States foreign
137. I have developed this viewpoint in an essay to appear in Airr, a literary journal
published in Houston, Texas.
138. CONSULTATIVE CoUcIL 19-111.
139. Citizens do not have access to classified information, national news coverage is
slanted toward affirming foreign policy in periods of crisis, and only clear conclusions
wil receive attention in press or government; the more balanced scholarly critique will
be ignored except, perhaps, by other scholars, but it will not influence the public debate.
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policy in Viet Nam with our proclaimed commitment to a law-ordered
international society. That serious effort was impaired, in my judgment,
by defining the issues and maintaining the adversary spirit of the
Lawyers' Committee document. In a second round of public debate
the Lawyers' Committee has prepared under the auspices of a Con-
sultative Council composed of academicians a reply to the Govern-
ment's Memorandum. This reply does focus more directly on the
world order issues at stake and does provide the Government with a
new intellectual context within which to respond. It is a sign of health
for a democratic polity to engage in this sort of a dialogue during the
course of a major war; it may be almost unprecedented for citizens to
call their own government to account by an appeal to the constraints
and institutional procedures of international law. The outcome of this
dialogue, as well as its more scholarly analogues, may well shape our
perceptions of the requirements of world order so as either to endorse
or inhibit American involvements in a series of Viet Nam-type wars
in the decades ahead.
V. On the Constitutionality of Violating International Law
Professor Moore suggests that there is no legal authority to support
a view that the Executive has a Constitutional obligation to obey inter-
national law. What is more, he accuses me of advancing a "somewhat
monistic argument." I acknowledge my guilt. It appears to me that the
Constitution embodies the legal framework within which the Govern-
ment is entitled to act. The condemnation of aggressive war and the
United States' endorsement of the Principles of the Nuremberg Judg-
ment seem to make adherence to international law a matter of Con-
stitutional necessity. True, there is no established legal doctrine to this
effect, but the question is open enough that is seems reasonable to
contend that this is the way the Constitution ought to be authorita.
tively construed. As in domestic affairs, so in foreign affairs, we should
remember that it is a Constitution that we are expounding; as the
organic law of the society it must be constantly readapted to the needs
of nation and its citizenry. No need is more paramount at the present
time than to develop a Constitutional tradition of restraint upon the
Executive's virtually discretionary power to commit the nation to war
of any scope and duration. To insist on Constitutional sources of legal
restraint is a part of the wider global need to erode the prerogatives of
the sovereign state in the area of war and peace. So long as international
society remains decentralized the most effective legal restraints are
likely to be self-restraints, those that are applied from within rather
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than from without the sovereign state. For this reason we cannot neglect
the Constitutional dimension of an allegedly illegal participation by
the United States in the Viet Nam War. And for this reason it seems
appropriate for domestic courts to pronounce upon, rather than to
evade, such legal challenges as have been presented in the selective
service context.140
VI. A Comment on Professor Moore's Conclusion
Professor Moore concludes his article by affirming "that the conflict
cannot be meaningfully generalized in black and white terms" and
yet proceeds to do so. He acknowledges that "[filf because of Viet Nam
Americans must ask themselves hard questions about the use of na-
tional power and the proper goals of foreign policy, the North Vietnam-
ese must ask themselves equally hard questions about the use of force
as an instrument of major international change." These two sets of
questions as formulated by Professor Moore are not equally hard, nor
are they, it is well to add, impartial in tone or content. As expressed
throughout Professor Moore's article the United States' failure in his
view, may at most involve errors of judgment and lapses of prudence,
whereas North Viet Nam's failure consists of committing the most
serious possible international delinquency-waging a war of aggression.
Such a construction of the adversary positions greatly falsifies, in my
judgment, the true situation. An objective interpretation of the war, as
sympathetic with the United States contentions as the fact seem to
permit, would acknowledge that the conflict in Viet Nam is one in
which both sides sincerely, and even reasonably, perceive the other
side as the aggressor. Most disinterested interpretations would, in all
probability, tend to regard the United States as the sole aggressor,
at least with regard to carrying the war into North Vietnamese terri-
tory.
The way in which responsibility for the war is distributed is vitally
connected with what sorts of steps taken by which side are reasonable
preconditions to achieve a negotiated settlement. In this regard when
Professor Moore invokes U Thant to support the conclusion that "the
Viet Nam was [is] basically a political problem that can only be solved
by a political settlement", it seems only reasonable to add that the
Secretary General has laid most of the blame upon the United States
for prolonging and intensifying the war. In fact, U Thant's precondi-
140. See the important dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in the decision by
the Supreme Court to deny a petition for a writ of certiorari in Mitchell v. United States,
35 U.S.L.W. 3330 (1967).
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tions for a negotiated settlement include the prior termination of war
acts by the United States against North Vietnamese territory.
A second point of disagreement. Professor Moore writes as if the
United States and North Viet Nam are in a position of bargaining
parity. Such a predisposition not only overlooks the enormous disparity
in scale between the two countries, but also overlooks the fact that the
United States is fighting the war at a safe distance from its own society,
whereas the destructive impact of the conflict is now focused directly
upon the North Vietnamese homeland. This bargaining inequality is
directly relevant to Profesosr Moore's comments about the "hard line
from Hanoi." To advise the United States that it "must continue to
emphasize a negotiated settlement" is to write as if no credibility gap
existed as to the sincerity and diligence of prior American peace
efforts. Such a statement also ignores the extent to which the American
emphasis on negotiations has been expressed more through threatened
and actual escalations than by realistic offers to end the war on some
basis that preserves Hanoi's stake in the outcome to the same extent as
it preserves Washington's stake.
It is not possible to consider here the basis for a negotiated settle-
ment. I share Professor Moore's emphasis upon search for compromise
in Viet Nam and for a way eventually to give effect to the principle
of self-determination for the foresaken Vietnamese population. There
are, however, very serious problems with a negotiated settlement that
explain, perhaps, why neither side can envision any middle ground
between surrender and victory. Among these serious problems the
following can be mentioned:
(1) A coalition government in South Viet Nam seems unworkable
that either (a) excludes both Premier Ky and the N.L.F., (b) includes
Premier Ky but excludes the N.L.F., (c) includes the N.L.F. but ex-
cludes Premier Ky, or (d) includes both Premier Ky and the N.L.F.
These four alternative patterns exhaust the logical possibilities, and yet
no one of them seems to be a plausible basis for a stable South Viet
Nam if the war is ended without prior victory by either side;
(2) The negotiating dialogue has stressed bargaining between North
Viet Nam and the United States without any close attention being
accorded to the more immediately concerned adversaries, namely, the
N.L.F. and Saigon. There is no strong basis to believe either that the
two external actors can completely impose their will upon the two
internal factions or that the two external actors espouse views identical
with those held by the two internal factors. Therefore, bargaining
toward peace should be broadened at least conceptually to examine the
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positions and leverage of all four major participants in the Viet Nam
conflict. An obstacle to this position is the United States' insistence,
contrary to widespread neutral and expert interpretation, that the
N.L.F. has no identity separate from Hanoi;
(3) The administration of a peaceful settlement in South Viet Nam
must find a way to define what constitutes "infiltration" and what con-
stitutes foreign military intervention. These conceptions are even hard
to define and even harder to administer effectively. Is an ethnic "South-
erner" an infiltrator when he returns unarmed from North to South
Viet Nam? By what criteria? Can the regime in Saigon purchase or
receive military equipment from outside states as it wishes? Can the
government in Hanoi? What criteria can be developed to limit foreign
participation in a post-cease-fire environment in Viet Nam? Can a
means be found to apply these criteria on a non-political basis? The
Geneva machinery of 1954, with its International Control Commis-
sion, operates on a troika principle (Poland, Canada, and India) with
each rival ideological orientation holding a veto. Would either side be
willing to eliminate its own veto or to allow a veto to its adversary? If
not, can a mutually acceptable basis for impartial administration be
agreed upon?
These are some of the tough questions that beset the search for a
negotiated settlement. Their answer is obviously worth seeking. A
solution may rely upon substituting an all-Asian presence, possibly
under Japanese initiative, for the Western presence that has dominated
Vietnamese society since the Nineteenth Century (except for the
equally tragic interlude during World War II).
VII. A Concluding Unscientific Postscript
The extra-legal setting of the United States involvement in Viet Nam
is essential if a serious attempt is to be made to rethink the foreign
policy premises that have led to this long and painful involvement. If
it is correct that we have been led into a costly and unjust war in Viet
Nam by ignoring our real interests in world affairs, then it is impor-
tant to explain how this came about. In the context of a discussion of
the relevance of international law, the main contention is that a fair-
minded attention to the restraints and procedures of the international
legal order would have served and continue to serve the real interests
of the United States to a far greater extent than do policies arrived at
by calculating short-term national advantage purely in terms of maxi-
mizing national power, wealth, and prestige. In Viet Nam, the Ameri-
can attempt to control the political outcome to accord with its geo-
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political preferences (regardless of world order consequences) requires
an altogether disproportionate commitment even if one approves of the
objective sought.
Such a disproportionality suggests that our policy-making process is
not being rationally focused upon our "real national interests" in world
affairs. This lack of focus seems to arise from a sort of rigidity that
comes from endorsing an ideological interpretation of contemporary
international conflict. This endorsement takes precedence over world
order considerations in American foreign policy and is likely to lead
us into future Viet Nams unless it is repudiated. Ideological opposition
to Communism and Communist influence as the main premise for mil-
itary commitment is more dangerous than discredited foreign policies
based on the pursuit of wealth and power. At least the policies of con-
quest left the victor with tangible gains and the prospect of tangible
gain allowed for a rational calculation of the proportionality of means
and ends. But in the circumstances of a Viet Nam, precisely because
the putative gains are intangible-even sacrificial-there is no way to
conclude that it costs too much. To question this reasoning it is neces-
sary to be explicit about its relevance. Therefore, to convey my own
sense about bringing United States foreign policy into a closer appre-
ciation of its real interests, including a greater deference to the con-
straints and procedures of international law, it seems useful to carry
the legal analysis beyond the boundaries of law and world order.
Hence, an unscientific postscript that is at once an explication of the
wider orientation of United States foreign policy and a plea for its
reorientation.
The United States Government contends that it has no selfish motives
in Viet Nam. As President Johnson explained:
We're not trying to wipe out North Vietnam. We're not trying to
change their government. We're not trying to establish permanent
bases in South Vietnam. And we're not trying to gain one inch of
new territory for America.
141
This absence of selfish motives does not establish the beneficial quality
of the American involvement in Viet Nam. The United States pursues
its military course in Viet Nam because it is determined to defeat a
Communist-led insurgency that sprung up years ago in South Viet Nam
as a consequence of many domestic and international factors, only one
of which was encouragement from and support by North Viet Nam.
141. President Johnson's Address to the American Alumni Council, N.Y. Times, July 18,
1966, at 2, col. 3.
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The United States acts as if the war in South Viet Nam was a conse-
quence solely of aggression from the North.
In actuality, the war in South Viet Nam is being waged in a complex
post-colonial setting wherein pressures for national self-assertion inter-
act with ideological movements. Many Vietnamese are concerned with
attaining their nationhood unencumbered by foreign domination. The
United States is opposing revolutionary nationalism, as well as Com-
munism, in South Viet Nam. And the United States is fighting on
behalf of a native regime dominated by a reactionary military elite;
Premier Ky was a mercenary pilot for the French in both the Algerian
War of Independence and the First Indochina War and identifies him-
self with the politics of military dictatorship.
To wage war for or against an idea is no less destructive than to
embark upon conquest for territory or for treasure. Over a century
ago John Stuart Mill warned about the use of military power in the
service of an idea:
We have heard something lately about being willing to go to war
for an idea. To go to war for an idea, if the war is aggressive, not
defensive is as criminal as to go to war for territory or revenue.1 42
Ideological motivation may indeed be intense. Its roots are often
hidden in the past. We embarked upon a program to resist Commu-
nism in 1947 with the formulation of the Truman Doctrine.143 Such
a program, at that time, was closely and sensibly related to certain geo-
political realities. The Soviet Union was ruled by a military dictator
and it maintained tight control over Communist states and parties
elsewhere. Western Europe was still weak from World War II. The
colonial system was in its early stages of disintegration. Global Com-
munism was a reality to be resisted and feared, although the Commu-
nist adversary was cautious, itself badly stunned and damaged by World
War II. Since 1947 many changes have taken place, not least of which
is the development of nuclear weapons and their deployment in a pos-
ture of mutual deterrence. The Soviet Union has followed an increas-
ingly conservative foreign policy and its domestic society has been the
scene of progressive liberalization. The Communist group of states has
fallen into conflict, and many rather disjoined national varieties of
Communism have emerged. Communism is today often a species of
nationalism, not internationalism. Western Europe has recovered fully.
Its main states are prosperous and stable.
142. J. S. MILL, ESSAYS ON POLrMCS AND CuLTURE 405 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1962).
143. For a persuasive comprehensive analysis of the evolution of the United States
foreign policy response to Communism, see D. Honowrrz, FRom YALTA To VrLETNt (195).
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Despite these changes in the international setting the United States
has not significantly altered its dogmatic opposition to Communism.
In Viet Nam President Johnson is carrying forward the basic policies
of prior Administrations. 144 These policies center upon the assumption
that it is always adverse to United States interests to allow a society to
become identified as "Communist." To call a movement "Communist"
that can also draw upon the revolutionary nationalism of a society, as
both the Vietcong and Hanoi can, is to overlook one real base of polit-
ical potency. Viet Nam, unlike other Asian states, is a country where
Communist leadership under Ho Chi Minh has for several decades
commanded almost all of the forces of anti-colonialism and nationalism.
To resist these forces is to become allied with reactionary elements in
the society. Unaided, these reactionary elements would have no pros-
pect of prevailing over a popularly based nationalist movement, wheth-
er or not it is Communist led. To defeat such a nationalist movement,
if at all, presupposes an enormous foreign effort on behalf of the reac-
tionary faction, an effort of the sort the United States has been making
on behalf of successive reactionary regimes in Saigon. The result for
South Viet Nam is, at best, a dependence that entails a new subser-
vience to an alien Western power. Certainly the United States has in-
troduced more military might into Viet Nam than the French ever
used to dominate the country during the colonial period. To have
allowed a Vietcong victory and a possible subsequent reunification of
Viet Nam under Hanoi's auspices would have merely ratified the
process of self-determination internal to Viet Nam that evolved since
the early efforts against the French. Such a nationalist solution even
if Communist in form would not have posed any serious danger to
Western interests and certainly not to direct United States security
interests. Viet Nam has a long tradition of fearing and resisting Chinese
domination, and there is every reason to suppose that this tradition
would persist in a Communist era. The non-Communist neighbors of
Viet Nam have, with the possible exception of Laos, stable govern-
ments and strong capabilities to maintain internal security.
144. "There is an American consensus on foreign affairs, and the Johnson Administra-
tion may legitimately argue that its programs carry out in action what the country de-
mands in principle. . . . Mr. Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam, but so did Mr.
Kennedy when he altered the American commitment in that country from one of as-
sistance and counsel to the South Vietnamese government to direct, if still limited, military
engagement with the Vietnamese insurgents. So did Mr. Eisenhower 'escalate,' or mote
properly, inaugurate, the American involvement when, in 1954, he stepped into the role
the exhausted French abandoned and chose to sponsor and sustain a noncommunist
government in Saigon that would prevent the country's unification under the communist
Viet Minh movement which had led the war to expel the French." E. STILL7MAN &
W. PFAFF, supra note 99, at 4.
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The United States has made an utterly unconvincing appeal to prin-
ciples of world order; it purports to be resisting aggression in South
Viet Nam. Such a contention is without any firm factual base, but its
allegation in a circumstance of ambiguity allows the United States Gov-
ernment to maintain its war effort without admitting its true motiva-
tion, thereby confusing its supporters and angering its opponents. As
Ralph K. White, an American psychologist who has made an unemo-
tional study of the basis for perceiving aggression in Viet Nam writes:
"There has been no aggression on either side-at least not in the sense
of a cold-blooded, Hitler-like act of conquest. The analogies of Hitler's
march into Prague, Stalin's takeover of Eastern Europe, and the North
Korean attack on South Korea are false analogies." White also docu-
ments his conclusion that "aggression by us seems as obvious to them
as aggression by them seems to us."'
14
One trouble with fighting for an idea is that there is no way to
measure how much sacrifice its defense is worth. An absolutism sets in.
The image of the enemy that justifies his destruction is held secure
against prudence, reason, and morality. Only clear inferences of Com-
munism, of aggression, and of good intentions vindicate the death and
destruction inflicted upon Viet Nam. The United States can maintain
these clear inferences only by denying reality or by testing reality in
the same primitive way that the Aztecs justified their belief that the
corn on which their civilization depended would not grow unless there
were human sacrifices. "The fact that the corn did grow was probably
considered solid evidence for such a view; and in those years when the
harvest was bad, it was doubtless argued that the gods were angry be-
cause the sacrifices had been insufficient. A little greater military effort
would result, a few more hearts would be torn from their quivering
bodies, and the following year it was highly probable that the harvest
would be better and the image consequently confirmed."' 40 Kenneth
Boulding regards primitive reasoning of this kind as the way we sustain
our commitment in Viet Nam-that is "by appeals to analogy, self-
evidence, and to the principle that if at first you don't succeed try more
of the same until you do."'147 We are entrapped in a dangerous, self-
destructive myth in Viet Nam, the elimination of which can only be
sought after the relief of peace, if then. Now we can only justif , the
sacrifices we have already made by increasing them to the point where
145. White, Misperception of Aggression in Vietnam, 21 J. INT'L ArFAIs 123, 125 (1957).
146. Boulding, The Learning and Reality-Testing Process in the International System,
21 J. INV'L AP'AMs 1 (1967).
147. Id. 2.
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we hope its objective will be reached, regardless of the cost to ourselves
and to Viet Nam.
Finally, there is "the credibility gap." Not only is the inference of
aggression needed to enable the use of a rhetoric of legitimacy in de-
scribing the American efforts in Viet Nam, but the objective of these
efforts is disguised. We proclaim over and over again our search for a
negotiated settlement, the sincerity of which Professor Moore endorses,
and yet we accompany this search by ever-higher escalation and by
pre-conditions that by mid-1967 must be interpreted to entail sur-
render by the adversary. President Johnson writes to Ho Chi Minh
that he is "prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your
country and the further augmentation of United States forces in South
Viet Nam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Viet Nam
by land and by sea has stopped."1 48 How could the Vietcong maintain
itself at this stage without supplies and equipment from the North?
The effect of Johnson's proposal is to suggest that United States mil-
itary effort in the South cannot be matched by Northern aid to the
N.L.F.: it is to compel the other side to act as if it had been the aggres-
sor. Ho Chi Minh's rejection of such an offer had to be expected. Only
a combined disposition by Hanoi and the N.L.F. to call off the insur-
gency would seem acceptable, only a victory for American power and a
defeat for its adversary made militarily possible, if at all, because we are
not fighting against Communism, but only against the relatively be-
leaguered small Communist state of North Viet Nam.
This note in conclusion is an attempt to provide a political setting
for the world order claims that the United States has made on behalf
of its action in Viet Nam. Without a sense of this setting any appraisal
of the legal issues at stake is ultimately without its proper context.
Since it is "we" who are perceiving the aggression in Viet Nam, it is
essential to know why our understanding of the war is not shared by
people elsewhere. Only after making an ideological jail-break and there-
after rediscovering our real values and our interests at home and abroad
can we avoid future Viet Nams. I am convinced that we will look back
upon the war in Viet Nam as the greatest tragedy ever in American
foreign policy, as a deviation from American political traditions that
will appear comprehensible in retrospect only because, in Mill's phrase,
we were "willing to go to war for an idea."
148. For the texts of President Johnson's letter (dated Feb. 2, 1967) and President
Ho Chi Minh's reply (dated Feb. 15, 1967), see N.Y. Times, March 22, 1966, at 10, col. 2.
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